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In 1945 Truman and Churchill proposed to Stalin that British and American troops were to
withdraw to the areas assigned to them as occupation zones and that the areas thus evacuated
were to be occupied by the Russians; in exchange American, British, and French troops were
to be sent to Berlin for the joint occupation of that city. Arrangements for free access to Berlin
for the Western Allies were to be made by the Military Governors. No written agreement was
made to provide forfree access to Berlin for the occupation forces of the Western Allies.*
— Konrad Adenauer
Today, as everyone can see, we have reached a new epoch in European and German history.
This is an age which points beyond the status quo and the old political structures in Europe.
This change is primarily the work of the people, who demand freedom, respect for their human
rights and their right to be masters of their own future. 2
-- Helmut Kohl
'Konrad Adenauer, Konrad Adenauer: Memoirs J945-53 (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1966), 141.
2Helmut Kohl, "A Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and
Europe," When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification, eds., Harold James
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• CHAPTER 1 •
INTRODUCTION
Bullfight critics ranked in rows
Crowd the enormous plaza full.
But only one there is who knows.
And he's the man who fights the bull.'
President John F. Kennedy, as quoted by his brother, recited this piece of poetry to
his staff in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. His allusion to
presidential responsibility, as correct as it may be, does not imply that once the bullfighter
has made a grave error, the critics are not capable of analyzing that error after the fact and
compiling lessons for the bullfighters of the future. With this in mind, this paper contends
that improper leadership and lack of bureaucratic skill on the part of the new Kennedy White
House team allowed the Soviets to keep the political and diplomatic initiative throughout the
Berlin Crisis in 1961 and surprise the President and his Administration with the construction
of the Berlin Wall. This blundering approach to decision making subjected the U.S. and its
allies to unnecessary additional risk, and permitted the establishment of a new and
troublesome status quo that lasted for nearly three decades.
Intelligence analysis played a crucial role in the presidential decision making process
throughout the Berlin Crisis. This paper focuses on how intelligence analysis might have
aided or misled President Kennedy during the 1961 phase of the crisis, especially during the
months of January to July. It also examines presidential leadership of the decision making
unit. It considers excerpts of analysis and official correspondence received by the President
'Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy In His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Press, 1988), 252.
2and sets that advice in the proper historical context by considering its source and the time
frame in which it was offered relative to the crisis. It discusses the options as President
Kennedy had them presented to him in an effort to recreate the crisis environment in the mind
of the reader, and to improve the current presidential crisis decision making process.
This paper assumes a building block approach which can be broken down into four
major areas of emphasis. First, it focuses on crisis management. It refines the period of
time analyzed relative to the Berlin Crisis as a whole, then, Chapters 2 and 3 describe the
international crisis management perspective and discuss the crisis background.
Second, the paper focuses on intelligence. Chapter 4 establishes a definition of
intelligence and then refines the area of the intelligence process on which we will concentrate,
namely analysis, as it was presented to the President. Chapter 5 discusses the role of
intelligence in crisis management. It also defines "success" and "failure" with regard to
intelligence. Chapter 6 discusses what U.S. intelligence requirements were vis a vis Berlin
and the Soviet Union during the 1961 phase of the crisis. President Kennedy was directly
involved in determining what these requirements were through his expression of U.S. national
principles and interests.
The paper's third area of emphasis is the analysts, or advisors, who were close to
Kennedy and made up the decision making unit. Chapter 7 considers not only their
bureaucratic position, but the personality issues as represented in historical accounts that may
have biased President Kennedy one way or another as he considered the crisis options.
Finally, with the above foundation laid. Chapter 8 will examine how the 1961 phase
of the crisis unfolded as a case study, made particularly interesting by the fact that this was
the first time that the U.S. and the U.S. S.R. squared off at the brink of nuclear war.
The Berlin Crisis in 1961 is a well-documented lesson for the crisis decision maker
and should be studied closely by contemporary U.S. presidents to prepare them for the
3inevitable challenges of leadership during current international crises. Because the
consequences of "learning on the job" can be quite severe, it is essential that presidents study
all aspects of U.S. crisis management history to avoid repetition of past mistakes. Chapter 9
concludes by discussing the successes and failures that intelligence analysis caused President
Kennedy during the crisis. Some unanswered questions are offered for consideration.
Finally, the paper identifies several universal lessons learned which should be applied during
any international crisis situation faced by a U.S. president, so as to enhance current crisis
management practices.
CRISIS TIME FRAME
Before getting too far, the term "Berlin Crisis" needs some clarification. The period
examined has its roots in the post World War II order established in Germany in the late
1940s. Berlin, situated one hundred and ten miles inside what was the Soviet occupied zone,
became the subject of bitter dispute between Western and Eastern spheres of influence. Since
there was no written agreement on land access to Berlin, Stalin took the opportunity to deny
that access with a blockade when it suited Soviet purposes, which were plainly to starve the
population into submission. The Western allies rendered the blockade useless with the Berlin
Airlift, conducted from June 1948 to May 1949. The West repeatedly stated, as in the
London Declaration of 3 October 1954, "that they will treat any attack against Berlin from
any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves." Although tensions subsided for
nearly a decade, geopolitical realities and Nikita Khrushchev brought Berlin back to center
stage.
Historians and archivists typically refer to the entire period from 1958 to 1962 as the
crisis; a period of time connected by multiple, distinct points of tension. James Richardson
says that the Berlin Crisis,
saw many variations in intensity, but since there were significant differences
between the responses of the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations, it
is divided into only two phases, 1958-60 and 1961-62, the periods of greatest
tension being the early weeks of the first phase, the days preceding and
following the Paris summit conference of May 1960, and the months between
June and October 1961. 2
It is generally accepted that although Khrushchev was still defiant regarding Berlin after the
Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), his speech to the East German Party Congress on 16
January 1963 may be taken as the termination of the crisis in Berlin.
This paper concentrates on the 1961 phase of the crisis, a singularly intense period
during which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. drew very close to war.
'James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers Since the Mid-Nineteenth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 206.
• CHAPTER 2 •
CRISIS MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE:
STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITY
Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing define an international crisis as, "a sequence of
interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short
of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war." 1 This
definition is certainly appropriate in the case of Berlin in 1961. However, Kennedy's
perception of the risks of war as "dangerously high" did not take shape until several months
after the election. This perception was initially held only by junior officials within the
Department of State.
The crisis management machinery of the U.S. executive during the Berlin Crisis was
not static, but evolving. Two U.S. presidents were involved. There were several other "hot
spots" besides Berlin which the U.S. leadership perceived to be boiling at the same time,
most notably, Laos and Cuba. This mix of problems distracted the Kennedy Administration's
focus on Berlin. Of course the common theme of all these situations was the bipolar conflict
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., with conventional and nuclear military forces functioning
as the primary game pieces in "global competition."
When crises arise, national leaders are forced to make rapid decisions which will have
significant short-term and long-term results. The basic task facing U.S. presidential advisors
is to sort out the distractions and define the crisis options accurately, then make
recommendations to the president as quickly as possible so that he or she can make the best
decision. The best decision is one which ideally leads to crisis de-escalation, with a final
'Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining. Decision-
Making, and System Structure in International Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1977), 6.
6outcome that best serves - or least detracts from — U.S. national interests. Of course those
interests need to be accurately defined and understood by all members of the decision making
unit as well. Alternatively, the less-than-ideal decision would escalate the crisis by various
means up to but not including war if the president believes that this is necessary before the
crisis can be resolved with acceptable results. If the decision to go to war is made
deliberately, the situation no longer fits the Snyder-Diesing definition of a crisis, but the
president and his team of crisis managers have not necessarily failed. However, if
miscalculation causes war to occur unintentionally, the crisis managers and their leader have
failed by definition.
The degree of success which nations achieve during these crises is determined not only
by the individual decision makers, but by the "machinery" which the decision makers have in
place at the time the crisis occurs, and how they use that machinery. The combination of
career diplomatic and military personnel with the relatively capricious nature of the elected
leadership, makes for a challenging crisis management structure. Additional elements of this
structure include, but are not limited to, the role of force, the role of diplomacy, the role of
intelligence, and the role of communications resources (including the media). These
structural elements are combined with the decision making styles of those who lead each
government department involved. Together, the people and the structure comprise the palette
with which the crisis outcome is painted.
In addition to the above elements, government outsiders or "consultants" — either
former government officials, retired military officers, or academics — also may play a strong
crisis management role and are sometimes deeply involved in the intelligence analysis
process. We see this in our case study of Berlin. The government structures and all of the
people involved, along with their respective strengths and weaknesses, can be looked at as
"tools" which must be used in complex combination by a U.S. president during a crisis. No
7two presidents' "crisis management toolboxes" look exactly alike, nonetheless, a mastery of
each of the available tools is achievable through deliberate study and sound personnel
decisions. Furthermore, this mastery is absolutely essential as presidential foreign policy
decisions have far-reaching ramifications and, once made, cannot easily be rescinded. Of
note, the failure to make a decision can also have great effect. Finally, one should keep in
mind that in the United States, the president ultimately bears full responsibility for the
outcome of a crisis — good or bad. This is a simple leadership principle which can only add
to the difficulty of crisis management.
Since no crisis takes place in a vacuum, it is important when studying a specific crisis
to consider what other distractions might "clutter the radar scopes" of the decision makers.
For example, in our case the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion (April 1961) had a tremendous
effect on the Kennedy Administration's view of the intelligence instrument and this effect was
at play as Berlin became the primary foreign policy focus as summer approached. We
discuss this effect later. Generally, appreciation of circumstances external to the crisis under
study will clear away the fog from which foreign policy action emerges, painting a more
realistic picture of the crisis management process.
When examining the Berlin Crisis, the model put forward by Snyder and Diesing is a
good place to start. The Snyder-Diesing model plots the intensity of a crisis on the vertical
axis versus time on the horizontal axis. The Berlin Crisis is depicted in figure 1 on the next
page using the Snyder-Diesing format. Although there are no "units" of intensity, this model
helps one visualize the pressures experienced by President Kennedy and his Administration
during 1961. For during crises, few factors are more significant than stress. As Richard J.
Heuer has noted, "if we consider the circumstances under which accurate perception is most
difficult, we find these are exactly the circumstances under which intelligence analysis is















Soviet proposal for "Demilitarized Free City"
Camp David meeting between Eisenhower and
Khrushchev agreeing to talks on Berlin
U-2 shoot down followed by aborted Paris Summit
U.S. presidential elections
Khrushchev renews separate peace treaty threat
Bay of Pigs invasion
NATO Summit in Oslo, Norway
Vienna Summit, Kennedy-Khrushchev
President Kennedy's T.V. address
Berlin Wall started/border closed
Cuban Missile Crisis
Khrushchev's speech to the East German Party
Congress
figure l 4
that is processed incrementally under pressure for early judgment.'" It may be useful to
refer to figure 1 periodically as the crisis is discussed.
Now that we have narrowed the scope of our analysis and sketched the crisis
management perspective, we move on to the crisis background.
4
Ibid., 15.
''Stan A. Taylor and Theodore J. Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis
Management," in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, ed. Alexander L. George
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 404.
* CHAPTER 3 *
CRISIS BACKGROUND
Until the Berlin Wall went up in August of 1961, Berlin's position made it a showcase
of Western technology and an "escape hatch" for millions of inhabitants of central Germany,
including many well-educated and highly-skilled men and women. From 1949 until August,
1961, approximately 3.6 million refugees fled to the West. Over 1.5 million escaped by
entering West Berlin. 6 Because of this, West Berlin was a constant irritant and source of
embarrassment to the dubious Soviet puppet regime in the Soviet Zone of Germany. 7 In
addition, Khrushchev's actions indicated that the general line of Soviet strategy with respect
to Berlin and to the German question as a whole was to disrupt the Atlantic Community and
destroy European integration. Berlin was a means to those ends. 8
The crisis was initiated by a Soviet note dated 27 November 1958, addressed to West
Germany as well as the three occupying powers. 9 As was the style of the Soviet Union, the
note's language was not particularly graceful or diplomatic:
...Thus, two states came into being in Germany. Whereas in West Germany,
whose development was directed by the United States, Britain, and France, a
government took office the representatives of which do not conceal their hatred
for the Soviet Union and often openly advertise the similarity of their
aspirations to the plans of the Hitlerite aggressors, in East Germany a
government was formed which has irrevocably broken with Germany's
6Wolfgang Kruse, ed., Berlin Brief (Berlin: Presse und Informationsamt des Landes
Berlin, 1974), 23.






The note declared "that Western violations had rendered the occupation agreements on Berlin
null and void, stating that the Soviet government intended to transfer its functions in
regulating access to Berlin to East Germany, and proposing that West Berlin become a
demilitarized Free City." 11 On the reunification of Germany, the note suggested that the
'two German states' enter into negotiations with the goal of setting up a confederation.
Khrushchev gave a six month ultimatum. If the Western alliance had not acceded to the
demands by then, the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the 'German Democratic
Republic' and relinquish control of access routes to Berlin to the East Germans. 12 Over the
months that followed, a flurry of diplomatic exchanges and meetings ensued with less than
fruitful results, but — thankfully — no serious miscalculations. Khrushchev allowed the six
month deadline to come and go without incident as discussions between heads of state were
scheduled. In late September of 1959, Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower met at
Camp David and agreed to reopen negotiations on Berlin.
In October of 1959, Khrushchev's Foreign Affairs article entitled "On Peaceful
Coexistence" framed the East-West conflict as a "competition." Khrushchev wrote that,
"Peaceful coexistence can and should develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of
satisfying man's needs in the best possible way." 13 He further stated that, "The main thing
is to keep to the positions of ideological struggle, without resorting to arms in order to prove
10The Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Documents on Germany, 1944-1970
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 360.
"Richardson, 206.
12John Mander, Berlin: Hostage For The West (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1962),
64.
13
Nikita Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs 38 (October 1959): 4.
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that one is right."
14 He claimed that the U.S.S.R. was not interested in a new war but that,
"life has shown that the North Atlantic Alliance is being gradually converted into an
instrument of the German militarists, which makes it easier to carry out aggressive plans." 15
Khrushchev's controversial proposal of a separate peace treaty with Germany was summarily
rejected by the Western allies for fear that it would lead to the permanent division of Berlin
and ultimately, through future manipulation of land access, communist takeover of West
Berlin. Khrushchev addressed this fear with the assertion that, "We resolutely reject any
attempts to ascribe to the Soviet Union the intention of seizing West Berlin and infringing
upon the right of the population in this part of the city to preserve its present way of life." 16
Then, on 1 May 1960, a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane, en route from Pakistan to
Norway, was shot down over the Soviet Union. Later that month, the Four Power Summit
Meeting in Paris was aborted as Khrushchev taunted the U.S. with the aircraft wreckage
before the entire world. Khrushchev insisted that the summit conference would have to be
postponed six to eight months until after the U.S. elections. During the months leading up to
the election, several minor disputes arose between East and West Berlin over travel
regulations between the two sides of the city.
In a letter to President-Elect Kennedy dated 12 November 1960, former Ambassador
to the Soviet Union (and later U.S. Ambassador at Large from January to November 1961),
Averell Harriman, detailed a "blunt and frank" conversation he had with a Soviet citizen
reputedly "quite close to Khrushchev." According to Harriman, the contact,
indicated that Khrushchev wanted to make a fresh start, forgetting the U-2








arms limitation and particularly nuclear control was a vital question. The
Russians don't want another devastating war — they have too much at stake.
They recognize the danger of the present tensions, including the spread of
nuclear weapons among other countries, unless an agreement is arrived at
fairly soon.
17
Three days later, Harriman sent another letter to Kennedy which detailed a message direct
from Khrushchev. Beyond congratulating the President-to-be, Khrushchev stated that he,
"hoped we could follow the line of relations that existed during President Roosevelt's time,
when Mr. Harriman was Ambassador...With a return to the spirit of Soviet-American
cooperation which we had during the war, not only would the people of both countries gain,
but so would the people of other countries and no one would lose." 18 Harriman called
Khrushchev a "realist" and recalled that during World War II, he could not "get anywhere on
matters of importance without getting to Stalin himself. Undoubtedly the same situation
exists today with Khrushchev." 19 On 6 January 1961, just as John F. Kennedy was about to
take office, Khrushchev, in a speech to Communist party organizations in Moscow, reiterated
his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.
President Kennedy had very little time to "read in" to the Berlin problem before he
needed to make crucial decisions. The Harriman letters were the first "intelligence analysis"
on the Soviet Union which he looked at from the presidential perspective as opposed to the
perspective of a U.S. Senator. Getting to know Nikita Khrushchev necessarily took a
backseat to appointing his presidential cabinet, putting his new "inner circle" in place, and
forging a team that could address domestic issues as well as foreign policy concerns. In
"Letter, Averell Harriman to President-Elect Kennedy, 12 November 1960, The Berlin
Crisis 1958-1962 [microform] Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey; Washington, D.C.:
National Security Archives, 1992.
18





addition to the cabinet and agency heads, the President had the power to fill some 1,200 so-
called Schedule C jobs. 20 Many people with multiple agendas competed for the new
President's time. Poor management of information, communications, and personnel selection
during the presidential transition period would become a major cause of early failure in Cuba.
The challenge in Germany was detailed in the 10 January 1961 draft of a paper
entitled "The Berlin Problem in 1961" which was written by Martin J. Hillenbrand, then the
Germany Desk Officer for the State Department. The paper, although not specifically
intended for the President, was forwarded to the White House via Dean Rusk as a part of the
transition package for the new Administration. In it Hillenbrand stated that, "there have been
some disturbing signs of Soviet reluctance to believe that the West, given its divisions and its
internal strains, would really prove firm in a showdown." 21 This paper provides an
interesting snapshot of the U.S. State Department view of the Berlin situation in January 1961
and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
On 28 January, eight days after Kennedy took office, Dean Rusk, the new Secretary
of State forwarded to the President "a brief chronology of the principal events relating to
Berlin which have occurred since the ending of the first Berlin blockade in 1949." Rusk
stated that, "there are indications that Mr. Khrushchev will be returning to the Berlin question
in due course, perhaps soon. The chronology will give you a brief outline of the past
pending a full briefing." 22 To add uncertainty to the issue for the President, Llewellyn
"Tommy" Thompson, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (April 1957 to August 1962), in
20Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 127.
21 Memorandum, Martin Hillenbrand to Prospective Secretary Rusk, 10 January 1961,
"Germany-Berlin General 1/61" folder, National Security Files, box 81, JFKL, 3.
"Memorandum, Dean Rusk to President Kennedy, 28 January 1961, "Germany-Berlin
General 1/61" folder, National Security Files, box 81, JFKL.
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a telegram from Moscow dated 30 January 1961, stated that "in non-political fields this
embassy [is] chiefly [a] supplier [of] raw materials and [is] not staffed to attempt finished
intelligence estimates. Nevertheless I am becoming increasingly convinced we are grossly
over estimating Soviet military strength relative to ours." 23 This "unofficial" estimate was
particularly interesting considering the much ballyhooed presence of a "missile gap" between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in favor of the Soviet Union. To President Eisenhower's chagrin,
Kennedy had exploited the existence of a missile gap as a political issue during the campaign,
only to find out after he was elected that the gap did not exist. Unfortunately for
Eisenhower, the intelligence confirming the non-existence of the gap could not be discussed
publicly due to the classified nature of the U-2 spy plane program.
So, the stage was set. Khrushchev appeared to want to avoid war but also seemed
interested in making gains in Berlin and appeared to believe that the new U.S. administration
lacked the political wherewithal to prevent him from pursuing his agenda there. The Atlantic
alliance was showing signs of nervousness. Complicating matters was the beginning of the
U.S. movement away from the stricdy nuclear strategy of Massive Retaliation toward the
expensive strategy of Flexible Response with its focus on using conventional forces first.
But, the Berlin Crisis made any conventional force buildup a very sensitive issue for three
reasons. First, it increased the danger of a Soviet miscalculation which might result from a
misunderstanding over why the U.S. was building up its forces. Second, due to the stress it
put on the Atlantic alliance as doubts of the American "nuclear guarantee" increased,
Khrushchev may have been motivated to be more aggressive in Berlin hoping for muted
response from disunited allies. Finally, the financial costs of a buildup were not likely to
receive strong U.S. domestic support as the perception of crisis, as reflected by minimal U.S.
"Telegram, Llewellyn Thompson to Secretary Rusk, 30 January 1961, The Berlin Crisis
1958-1962 [microform].
15
media coverage, was not widely held.
Of course Berlin was only one of many problems which Kennedy faced. His "radar
screen" was cluttered with the tensions in Laos and Cuba, as well as domestic economic and
civil rights problems — to name a few. Formulating intelligence requirements, as well as
collecting and analyzing information would be critical to President Kennedy in the crisis-filled
year ahead. Would the President act boldly to keep the U.S.S.R. at bay and protect the
prestige of the Atlantic alliance? Or would a miscalculation occur that would lead to a deadly
military conflict? Nuclear weapons insured that the stakes, measured in human lives, had
never been higher in all of human history.
• CHAPTER 4 *
INTELLIGENCE DEFINITIONS:
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
It is somewhat artificial to examine exclusively the intelligence element during a crisis
as there is often significant redundancy of intelligence effort among the elements of crisis
management structure mentioned in Chapter 2 (i.e., role of force, role of diplomacy, etc.)
Analysis of any one element will necessarily include considering aspects of the others. For
example, there are intelligence applications to diplomacy and the use of military force, just as
there are communications challenges to diplomacy, the use of military force and intelligence.
Notwithstanding this rather contrived approach, it is useful to isolate the intelligence process
as much as practical to allow for its thorough examination. We do not spend significant time
on the other elements of the crisis except where they overlap the intelligence analysis effort
and contribute directly to the presidential decision making process. Having established a
perspective of crisis management and looked at the background of the Berlin Crisis, it is
useful, before examining the intelligence analysis and presidential decision making dynamic,
to define some basic intelligence terminology.
"Intelligence is best defined as information collected, organized, or analyzed on behalf
of actors or decision makers. Such information may include technical data, trends, rumors,
pictures, or hardware."24 The elements of intelligence have commonly been grouped into
one of four categories: collection, analysis, covert action, or counterintelligence. 25 We
24
Jennifer Sims, "What is Intelligence? Information for Decision Makers," in U.S.
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, eds. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and
Gary Schmitt (Washington: Brassey's, 1995), 4.
"Abram N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence
(Washington: Brassey's (US), 1993), 8.
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look briefly at collection, covert action, and counterintelligence before focusing on analysis.
COLLECTION
Intelligence is collected from among a variety of sources, some "closed" or
clandestine (human sources, or technical sources — i.e., reconnaissance satellite/airplane
photography, etc.) and some "open" (world press, government statements, academia, etc.)
Human Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT, although essential for forming
subjective judgements of intention and analyzing technical data, can also be one of the most
unpredictable forms of collection. History has borne this out with regard to the Berlin Crisis.
West Berlin was a high traffic area for former East German citizens as they fled the
communist regime. This afforded the Western allies many opportunities for HUMINT
collection. Although Khrushchev publicly complained about Western intelligence activities
underway in Berlin, the situation there also provided many opportunities for the Soviets and
East Germans to pass false information to the West (counterintelligence). In fact, says
Jeffrey Richelson,
It was discovered after the fall of East Germany that most East Germans
recruited by the CIA since the early 1950s had been double agents operating
under the direction of the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS). In
addition to allowing the identification of CIA officers, the operation also
passed misleading intelligence to the CIA. 26
The most significant HUMINT success during 1961 was the recruitment of GRU Colonel
Oleg Penkovskiy. Says Richelson,
Penkovskiy passed great quantities of material to the CIA and the British Secret
Intelligence Service, including information on Soviet strategic capabilities and
"Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder: Westview Press,
1995), 251.
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nuclear targeting policy. Additionally, he provided a copy of the official
Soviet MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic Missile) manual — which was of
crucial importance at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 27
Intelligence provided by Penkovskiy initiated some of the Special National Intelligence
Estimates on Berlin during 1961 which we consider later. Penkovskiy was eventually
executed by the Soviets.
Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). Made up of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) among others,
TECHINT was used extensively to keep policymakers informed during the Berlin Crisis.
Interception of radio traffic, tapping of phonelines, and aerial photography are just a few
examples of TECHINT which were exploited in Berlin.
COVERTACTION AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Covert action is the "attempt by a government or group to influence events in another
state or territory without revealing its own involvement.
"
28 Counterintelligence is "the
effort to protect [state] secrets, to prevent [one's] state from being manipulated, and
(sometimes) to exploit the intelligence activities of others for [the] benefit [of one's own
state.]" 29 Detailed information on U.S. counterintelligence and covert action in Berlin in
1961 is not readily available. However, there are indications that the Soviets were
prosecuting an aggressive counterintelligence campaign against the West.
From 1953 to 1956, British and U.S. intelligence agents conducting TECHINT
operations in Berlin managed to tap wires used by the Soviet military authorities. By means
"Ibid., 248.
28Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks Or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and




of secret tunneling from a point in the American sector of Berlin, under the border between
the American and Soviet sectors, they were able to intersect cables running entirely within the
Soviet sector that linked the Soviet Air Force headquarters at Karlshorst with the city. The
tunnel was built jointly by Britain's MI6 and the CIA. Unfortunately, George Blake, a senior
MI6 officer in Berlin, was a Soviet spy. Consequently, the tunnel was compromised after
about a year of operations. The intelligence collected required nearly two more years for
analysis. Blake was finally tracked down, arrested, and convicted in May of 1961.M There
may have been a Soviet deception operation in place while Blake was with the British Foreign
Office in Berlin. He confessed in his trial that since 1953, he had given every important
document that came into his possession to his "Soviet contact."
On 9 May 1961, West German police in Wiesbaden arrested five persons accused of
being Communist agents. These arrests brought the total of such arrests in southern West
Germany in two days to thirty-three. 31 The likelihood that these espionage incidents were
related is probably low, however, these examples show that the possibility of deception
tactics poisoning the effectiveness of U.S. HUMINT and TECHINT collection efforts in
Germany was certainly plausible and probably very likely.
Despite these weaknesses in HUMINT and TECHINT, as well as the apparently
successful counterintelligence campaign waged against the West by the Soviets, useful
analysis of the information derived from the field of sources available was passed on to
decision makers. U.S. analysts took into account the unreliability of some of the information
gathered, capitalizing upon political and military experience and the refinement of analysis
techniques to provide decision makers useful intelligence products. This becomes apparent
when we consider the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special NIEs (SNIEs) made
30Shulsky, 140.
31New York Times, 10 May 1961
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available to the Kennedy Administration. When combined with White House, other policy
level correspondence and historical accounts, these estimates provide a reasonably accurate
representation of the analysis used by President Kennedy in his decision making process. It
is this body of analysis which we consider in some detail during our case study in Chapter 8.
ANALYSIS
What happens to the information between the collection phase and a presidential
decision is just as important as the collection itself. How, and in what form this information
travels from the collector, or gatherer, to the decision maker can make the difference between
sound policy, and miscalculation with disastrous global consequences. Whatever the source,
unprocessed or "raw" intelligence is filtered through some form of processing, or analysis, on
its way to the decision maker.
Says Shulsky, "In intelligence matters, analysts can rarely be completely confident of
the solidity of the foundations on which they are building; they must remain open to the
possibility that their evidence is misleading." 32 Analysis has always been a tricky business.
The pressure to consider all the possibilities and then make predictions has traditionally been
very high. When added to the possibility that the raw data may be incorrect, the frustration
analysts face is quite understandable. There is a sense that no matter how competent the
analyst, he or she does not have complete control of his or her own fate. In an effort to keep
the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the decision maker, analysts within the
professional Intelligence Community (IC) have avoided giving opinions and have leaned
toward presenting known data. Douglas J. MacEachin presents the following mission
statement for analysts in his article, "The Tradecraft of Analysis": to "Provide U.S.
! Shulsky, 197.
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policymakers with information and analysis they need to carry out their mission of
formulating and implementing U.S. national security policy." 33
SOURCES OF ANALYSIS
Today, the IC is usually described as containing several agencies or parts of agencies.
Commonly accepted among these are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the various branches of the
Armed Services; portions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), specifically the
counterintelligence sections of the FBI; certain bureaus or offices within the Department of
State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; as well as usually
unnamed offices for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence. 34
During the Berlin Crisis, the entire IC participated in the production of written NIEs
and SNIEs much as it does today. NIEs were produced on a scheduled basis and SNIEs were
produced on demand to meet specific intelligence needs. The final documents were submitted
to policy makers by the Director of Central Intelligence. They were prepared by the CIA and
the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force, and Joint Staff. The U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) also concurred on these
estimates. The USIB representatives generally included the Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; the Director of the National Security
"Douglas J. MacEachin, "The Tradecraft of Analysis," in U.S. Intelligence at the
Crossroads: Agendas for Reform, 65.
34 Taylor and Ralston, 409.
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Agency; the Assistant Director, FBI; and finally, a Representative to the USIB from the
Atomic Energy Commission.
In 1961, as is the case today, the President also received analysis from several other
individuals in addition to those in the IC. These others were not bent on avoidance of policy
suggestion. To the contrary, it was the role of the individuals advising at the policy level to
do just that: convert analysis into policy recommendations for the President. Of note in this
regard are the advisors whom Kennedy chose for his inner circle who ultimately became part
of a combination of sources of analysis, which found its locus outside of the traditional IC.
This combination of sources was made up of a distinct group of personalities which created a
unique intelligence analysis dynamic.
Personal relationships and personal leadership style have always been an integral part
of how a U.S. president reaches decisions. President Kennedy was no exception. The
personal opinion a president holds of the person whose signature appears on the bottom of a
point paper, intelligence estimate, or other document will add or subtract credibility from that
document as a useful piece of information from which the president must glean information to
make a decision. The credibility of the agency or department to which an individual belongs
may also add or subtract from this personal element. Archival documents alone cannot reveal
this "credibility factor."
In Chapters 7 and 8, we examine this personal dynamic as it played out in a unique
series of events which occurred within the first several months of the Kennedy presidency.
As far as events are concerned, without question, the Bay of Pigs invasion and Kennedy's
reaction to its outcome had a most profound effect upon the way information was managed
on its way to, and by, the President heading into the summer of 1961. Because of the failure
at the Bay of Pigs, the CIA incurred a huge loss of prestige which arguably affected the role
which the CIA played in the Berlin Crisis throughout the remainder of that year.
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Add the unique stress caused by the extremely high stakes of the crisis, to the friction
of personal relationships, and one can see that the movement from intelligence theory to
practice was full of unexpected surprises. In the following excerpt, Eleanor Lansing Dulles
expressed her frustration over the way in which the process unravelled in Berlin:
Intelligence with its emphasis on gathering facts from scattered sources
is not always what the word implies. Interpretation of bits and pieces of
gossip, military deployment, economic changes, movement of material and
blustering hostile leaders, lags behind reporting. Usually the interpretation is
by officials somewhat removed from the raw data. Sometimes they have little
feeling for the atmosphere and the sentiment which dictates the command
decision. In Washington the tasks are widely distributed. By the time the
story is told and the conclusions brought to the top leaders through the
channels of interagency consultations, hours and days which may be crucial
have elapsed. Until there is a way of moving from the outside perimeters of
watch posts to the inner councils of decision in minutes and not days, the
security of the nation will be precarious. Even the Cuban missile crisis came
slowly into focus. In Berlin in 1961 the intelligence reading came after the
communist move. 35
Unfortunately, this frustration expressed by Eleanor Lansing Dulles twenty-five years ago still
haunts the U.S. executive today, despite modern technology.
Following this discussion of crisis management and intelligence, we now combine the
two topics and discuss the role of intelligence in crisis management.
"Eleanor Lansing Dulles, The Wall: A Tragedy In Three Acts (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1972), 26.
• CHAPTER 5 *
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Crisis management poses particularly difficult intelligence challenges. Due to actual
and perceived time pressure, intelligence machinery must be exercised in the most efficient
and precise manner possible so as to support the President in defining his or her crisis
options. It must then be used to track the execution of the selected option and the results of
that decision to provide a "feedback loop" to gage success or failure and to determine the
need for followup action. Due to the pace of events in an international crisis, as opposed to
periods of lower tensions, the intelligence process becomes a repetitious cycle which must be
defdy managed by the President. The President does this by asking probing questions and
getting the most out of every member of the team through responsible delegation of
presidential authority. This chapter draws heavily upon the article by Taylor and Ralston
entitled "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management," which was published as a chapter
in Alexander George's book, Avoiding War: Problems in Crisis Management.
Intelligence posed significant problems for the new Kennedy Administration in early
1961. According to Taylor and Ralston, "the terrain between the policy-making apparatus
and the intelligence agencies has been a major battleground in a bureaucratic war, the
outcome of which shapes the role of intelligence in crisis management." 36 They go on to
say that, "this battle has dominated the attention of every new administration during both its
transition into office and its early days in office." 37 Unfortunately for the Kennedy




As the Intelligence Community (IC) is primarily staffed by career personnel, it will
usually provide much of the institutional memory of regional political situations for the
president, although he or she may venture elsewhere for this information, as Kennedy did
with Berlin. The required regional knowledge usually does not exist in depth at the
presidential level. 38 A former senior member of the Carter National Security Council staff
articulated this problem very clearly: "the most staggering thing was walking into the White
House during our first major crisis, wondering what to do, and then all of a sudden realizing
that there are no rules, no books, and no procedures. One of your first thoughts is to ask the
President; but the President doesn't know; he only knows what the staff tells him." 39
In the precrisis, or early stages of a crisis, intelligence is the most general as the IC
usually does not have its assets focused on the region of interest. As the crisis unfolds,
"Ambiguity and uncertainty reign, there is a dearth of real information, and speculation runs
rampant." 40 Ideally, with skill and good timing, a rapid "ramping up" process occurs which
keeps the President updated and facilitates good decisions which will lead to the de-escalation
of the crisis with positive results.
INTELLIGENCE SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Causes of crisis management intelligence failure include communication problems,
bureaucratic problems, psychological impediments, as well as ideological and political
obstacles.
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Generally, success begins by correctly defining the intelligence requirements.










assigned and conducts the collection. The raw information is processed or analyzed as
required, then passed on in a timely fashion to the decision maker, ultimately for the
purposes of our case study, President Kennedy. The same raw information will have been
analyzed multiple times by lower level decision makers before its presentation to the




generated by one of the causes listed above, can reveal itself in a
number of ways throughout the process. First, initial intelligence requirements may not be
correctly identified. Second, once identified, the collection might not be conducted properly,
or at all. Third, even proper collection may be negatively affected by counterintelligence
techniques used by the adversary. Fourth, once collected, the information may be poorly
analyzed or not converted into a useful product for the president. Finally, the information
and recommendations may not be passed to the decision makers in a timely manner, or at all.
Some of the biggest communications problems include overcompartmentation, and
information overload. Overcompartmentation occurs when intelligence information is
classified into overly narrow categories, usually on the basis of collection sources. This can
lead to the President not having key intelligence information during a crisis. For example,
during the Bay of Pigs invasion, "analysts who had information about internal Cuban
conditions that would have challenged some of the optimistic assumptions of the plan were
kept from influencing those who were planning the invasion." 42
Information overload occurs when critical bits of intelligence information have been
collected, however, they are hidden among large amounts of distracting information and






president is inundated with intelligence products, "unfiltered" by his or her staff, the
likelihood is high that he or she may miss the critical "piece of the puzzle."
Bureaucratic problems include budgetary constraints, competition between IC agencies
(or even within agencies), strict and lengthy chains of command which impede information
flow, creation of ad hoc procedures during crises, and the tendency of intelligence analysts to
emphasize worst case scenarios. 44 In Berlin, the focus on the worst case scenario - blocked
access leading to general war - caused the IC to lose its focus on the possibility that the
U.S.S.R. might be searching for a way to change the status quo without triggering military
conflict with NATO, which is exactly what they were doing. Also, the creation of ad hoc
procedures were prevalent, not just because of the crisis, but because of the belief held by the
Administration that the IC, especially the CIA, was unreliable. At a minimum, CIA advice
was viewed skeptically as the agency operated in the crippled state caused by the taint of the
post-Bay of Pigs investigation.
Psychological impediments are described by Taylor and Ralston: "Existing beliefs and
mental images tend to screen out or dilute the significance of new information, and pressures
to conform to prevailing policy assumptions cause distortions in the evaluation of new
information." 45 Crisis-induced stress can cause analysts and decision makers to "focus
almost myopically on the latest piece of information. n46 It can cause them to fall prey to the
psychological requirement for "cognitive consistency," that is the tendency to see what they
expect to see and sometimes what they want to see. This is closely related to the tendency to
believe that things will remain as they are. Also, the image of the hostile opponent can have










Ideological and political obstacles can also come into play, "when intelligence
judgments are altered to suit the views of those receiving them or to further the interests of
those reporting them." According to Taylor and Ralston,
In his recounting of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert Kennedy reported that
"personalities change when the President is present, and frequently even strong
men make their recommendations on the basis of what they believe the
President wishes to hear. More blatant, however, were the efforts Kennedy
also observed by senior policy makers to "exclude certain individuals from
participating in a meeting with the President because they held a different point
of view." 48
Even if none of these obstacles comes into play, the entire responsibility for crisis
management ultimately rests upon the President. Say Taylor and Ralston, "the most fragile
link in the intelligence process occurs after the collection, analysis, and production stages are
complete. Then senior policy makers must decide which of the large array of intelligence
products they will read, believe, and act upon." 49 In other words, if the President makes
the wrong decision despite good intelligence, no intelligence failure occurs but the crisis
outcome is still negative.
In the case of Berlin in 1961, the direct cause and effect relationship between
intelligence failure and general war was sobering, but the Administration's positive
exploitation of the IC was lacking. In the nuclear charged environment of the day, the
weight of foreign policy decisions could not have rested more heavily upon the shoulders of
President Kennedy and his inner circle of advisors, but the odds for intelligence success were







• CHAPTER 6 *
U.S. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS DURING THE CRISIS
Defining and sorting out the complex decision options available to the U.S. in Berlin
was a challenging task made more emotionally intense by the potentially dire consequences of
a bad decision. The Kennedy Administration was by no means lacking in intelligence
machinery for determining just what the options were, or advice on which option was best
and how to proceed after having made any particular choice. In fact, just the opposite was
true. The Administration had so much to work with that it was overwhelmed. The problem
was that some of the intelligence machinery was broken, and in some cases - particularly
with regard to negotiations - none of the options were good. Added to this was the
confusion of the transition to the presidency, inexperience, political pressures, and occasional
lapses of good judgment. All in all, the outlook was rather grim.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the initial burden carried by the Administration
during the crisis was to define the intelligence requirements before the machinery could work.
Intelligence requirements were based upon four specific needs: first, the requirement for
institutional knowledge of the record of history to be understood at the presidential level;
second, the need for a sound consensus among U.S. policymakers as to what comprised U.S.
principles and interests with regard to Berlin; third, the need for an accurate assessment of
current Soviet and East German capabilities and intentions; fourth, and finally, the need for a
dependable information "feedback" feature which would allow decision makers — once a
particular option had been analyzed, chosen, and executed -- to monitor the Soviet response,
to insure it matched the predicted model, and to update intelligence requirements.
The record of Soviet actions in Berlin since World War II provided a data base from
which intelligence analysts might predict future Soviet actions, as well as Soviet reactions to
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U.S. moves. U.S. civilian and military analysts, both inside and outside of the Intelligence
Community (IC), with access to this information had to study it carefully to determine
decision option recommendations. They also needed to present the germane portions of this
historical information to the President in a concise, efficient manner.
The second need upon which a proper definition of intelligence requirements was
based — policymaker consensus on U.S. principles and interests — had been met in effect by
a statement issued by the Department of State on 20 December 1958. Entitled "Statement
Setting Forth the Legal Right of the United States to Access to and Presence in Berlin," this
document had its basis in fundamental questions of international law. The document
summarized all applicable agreements and their historical context. Martin J. Hillenbrand
contends that although this document was somewhat lengthy, study of it reveals that U.S.
vital interests in Berlin were limited to: 1) the security of U.S. forces in West Berlin;
2) access to West Berlin; and 3) the security of the inhabitants of West Berlin.
Circumstances for military intervention for any other reason were not defined in the statement
and so arguably fell outside of U.S. vital interests. 50
The third specific need upon which intelligence requirements were based was an
accurate confirmation of Soviet, and to a lesser extent East German, capabilities and
intentions under the high pressure of the crisis environment — despite possible
counterintelligence efforts by the Soviets. This confirmation had qualitative and quantitative
aspects. The quantitative side entailed the count of military equipment (i.e., the "order of
s0Martin J. Hillenbrand, telephone interview, 14 March 1997. At the time of the crisis,
Hillenbrand was the Germany Desk Officer at the State Department and worked closely with
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. He went on to become the
U.S. Ambassador to Hungary in 1967, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
in 1969, and the U.S. Ambassador to Germany in 1972. After retiring from the Foreign
Service, he worked at a private international consulting firm in Paris. He currently works at
the Center for Global Policy Studies at the University of Georgia in Athens.
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battle"). Colonel Penkovskiy contributed to this confirmation to a great degree, as did the U-
2 spy plane program.
Quantitative analysis, although never easy, is less difficult than qualitative analysis and
estimating intentions. Much more delicate and uncertain, the variable of personalities
complicates matters tremendously. For example, how might one have predicted
Khrushchev's actual agenda as opposed to his rhetoric? Even Penkovskiy (and others) could
only postulate. There were many clues, but the President expected — and needed — clear and
precise answers with which to make confident decisions. These types of answers were
illusive but constitute the crux of our case study in Chapter 8.
The fourth need upon which intelligence requirements were based was the sources of
intelligence "feedback." The ability to gage Soviet reaction relied heavily upon the IC.
Unfortunately, the feedback loop of the intelligence cycle was still weak in the summer of
1961, despite the lessons of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The surprise and disarray with which
the Administration reacted to the construction of the Berlin Wall in August is evidence of this
weakness. We also examine this more closely in Chapter 8.
The four needs listed above fostered the requirement for the answers to several more
specific questions, the answers to which would, in essence, dictate U.S. intelligence
requirements: 1) What did President Kennedy believe were the United States' national
interests in Berlin?; 2) What were the U.S. options?; 3) Under what circumstances, if any,
should the U.S. have committed conventional forces to combat over Berlin?; 4) Under what
circumstances, if any, should the U.S. have used nuclear weapons (tactical and/or strategic)?;
5) What were the short-term and long-term effects of each U.S. option?; 6) What were the
likely Soviet reactions to each option?; 7) What were the Soviet Union's interests,
specifically, what might have made Khrushchev view general war as a "reasonable" option in
the case of Berlin?; 8) What were likely allied reactions to each U.S. option?; and, 9) What
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combination of crisis option and Soviet reaction was the most preferable?
A note here on historical context is appropriate. As mentioned earlier, U.S. actions in
Berlin, in a large part, prompted the six year debate which would lead to a Western alliance
strategy shift from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. Although it would not become
operational policy within NATO until January of 1968, Flexible Response would be driven
by the realization of the need for conventional force options in Germany to avoid the decision
between 'suicide and surrender.' 51 This was an incredibly significant sea-change in national
security philosophies which was made during tense, tenuous circumstances. The ambiguous
circumstances which marked the conclusion of the crisis in Berlin would come to be defended
as a vital element of NATO strategy. 52 Despite the ultimate success of Flexible Response in
keeping the allies content and apparently deterring the Warsaw Pact, the uncertainty caused
by the strategy debate in 1961 only contributed to the intensity of the crisis.
Richardson states that the "fundamental premise of the Western response which was to
be articulated by the Kennedy Administration [was] that the West should not insist on
upholding the status quo in every detail, but should define the essential interests on behalf of
which it was prepared to incur the ultimate risk." 53 The ultimate risk, of course, was
general war, including the strong likelihood of the exchange of nuclear weapons.
After much consideration of the ideas presented to him in a heavy stream of
memoranda screened through McGeorge Bundy (Kennedy's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs), and many personal consultations, the President publicly expressed what he
believed were the essential American interests in Berlin in his televised speech to the nation
51 Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate Over Strategy in





of 25 July 1961: a continued military presence in West Berlin, unimpeded access for those
forces and the security and viability of West Berlin itself, a "duty to mankind to seek a
peaceful solution," and the need to continue negotiations. As expected, it was the military
measures, which dominated the American public's perception of the response. 54 The
intelligence requirements were in effect defined by whatever was required to support the
interests expressed in the 1958 statement as reiterated and augmented by Kennedy. The
intelligence requirements to support the military measures were straight forward. The
intelligence analysis requirements to support the political decisions (i.e., negotiations), and
estimate responses to U.S. moves, were not nearly as clear cut.
President Kennedy's concise statement of America's interests in Berlin belied the
intense intelligence effort made by his inner circle, outside advisors, the IC, and military
contingency planners to provide him with the cogent, succinct analysis required to make the
decisions necessary to guide the country through the crisis. Before Vienna, the analysis was
good but sparse, and given little attention. After Vienna, the amount of analysis was so
overwhelming that it was difficult to pick through all the paper to make a decision. As
Hillenbrand asserts, it was a case of "too much individual brilliance." 55
The President's actions are revealed in Chapter 8 and, by following the decision
making process, one will see just how close the U.S. came to general war. In short,
President Kennedy believed that Berlin was critical to the credibility of the Western alliance.
He believed that the U.S. needed to build up conventional forces in the area to expand
military options to encompass more than just nuclear weapons. If the Soviets initiated moves
to block access to Berlin, and the Western allies were unable to counter the block, Kennedy
was prepared to take military action with full knowledge that this action might escalate
54
Richardson, 211.
"Hillenbrand, telephone interview, 14 March 1997.
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uncontrollably to the nuclear level. So, although the official strategy of the alliance was still
Massive Retaliation, Kennedy chose a de facto Flexible Response option.
Considering the weight of these decisions, the shoddy work done by the
Administration, especially between the inauguration and the construction of the Berlin Wall in
mid August, was reprehensible. Let us examine President Kennedy's intelligence analysis
support team and see where the problems originated.
• CHAPTER 7 *
THE FINAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS:
THE BERLIN CRISIS DECISION MAKING UNIT
Having defined what Kennedy came to believe were the U.S. interests in Berlin, we
now turn to some of the individuals who provided analysis and advice to the President in
1961. A fascinating collection of actors, these men each provided unique color to the drama
that unfolded over Berlin. More importantly however, these men — along with the
President — made up the decision making unit during the crisis. Historical evidence shows
that the President's weak efforts at team building and leadership allowed personality conflicts
among these men to detract from professional interaction thus jeopardizing the U.S.
unnecessarily during the Berlin Crisis, and allowing the Soviets to keep the political and
diplomatic initiative throughout 1961.
This discussion by no means covers all of the people who contributed to the analysis
that Kennedy used. It briefly describes only the major Berlin Crisis participants with
particular attention paid to those advisors closest to the President: his White House staff, the
Director of the CIA, the Secretary of State, ambassadors, the Secretary of Defense, as well
as key government outsiders like Henry Kissinger and Dean Acheson. It is not the point of
this discussion to make a qualitative judgment of each person's professional abilities. Rather,
the following analysis shows how each member of the decision making unit related to
President Kennedy and in what way each contributed intelligence analysis to the Presidential
decision making process.
It is very important for the reader to recognize that although there was a high number
of astute thinkers in mid-grade positions at State, CIA, Defense and elsewhere, those loyal
individuals who had the President's ear - and who he trusted — were the ones who
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influenced presidential decisions. These individuals were the final "analysts" to handle
intelligence information before it was presented to the President. Recognize that the most
superlative piece of analysis, presented to the President by someone who had "fallen from
grace," or who was never really an insider, was not given the same level of attention that a
more dubious piece of analysis was which was presented to the President by a loyal, trusted
advisor. The cover letter or cover memo attached by his staff also heavily influenced the
President's perception of any written analysis which came across his desk. This personal
dynamic was critical to the intelligence analysis process at the presidential level, and remains
critical today.
Other than President Kennedy's White House staff and new appointees, the
intelligence instrument used by the Administration remained the same for Kennedy
immediately after his inauguration as it had been for his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower.
For political reasons, Kennedy chose to keep both CIA Director Allen Dulles and FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover on the team — a part of what Arthur Schlesinger called "the
strategy of reassurance." 56 Despite recommendations to replace Dulles and Hoover made by
Kennedy's campaign team, no major changes were made in the way that information was
handled in the Intelligence Community (IC) until after the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay
of Pigs in April. This watershed event brought the intelligence process to its knees,
subjecting it to heavy scrutiny and prompting significant change in the midst of the crisis in
Berlin. The decision making process changed dramatically again after Vienna as Kennedy
realized the gravity of the situation in Berlin. Five categories of advisors will be examined:
the White House staff, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and
consultants.
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The people closest to the President in the intelligence flow were the White House
staff. Members of the staff were Kennedy's political friends who tended to know how the
President thought about issues and most likely were even expected by the President to act on
his behalf without prior consultation under certain circumstances. In general, a President
picks "Special Assistants" whom he trusts implicitly, without reservation, not only for their
analytical capabilities but for their like-mindedness in approaching issues, and their personal
loyalty. However, effective presidents will surround themselves with lieutenants who tell
them the truth, not necessarily what they would like to hear. Candor, a rare quality, can turn
the ship of state before it becomes in extremis. But candor was not always present among the
members of the U.S. Berlin Crisis decision making unit. With that said, it is reasonable that
Kennedy's White House staff should be studied to discover what part it played in the
preparation and handling of intelligence analysis on Berlin prior to its ending up in the Oval
Office "in basket."
These individuals were no doubt asked by the President, "what did you think about
the such and such paper?" or, "what do you think about Under Secretary so and so?" The
answers to these questions about the personal dynamic are not found in the archives but
appear in personal accounts written later which we weigh against the archival documents and
the historical record to gain insight into the presidential decision making process.
McGeorge Bundy. One of the closest, if not the closest, advisors to Kennedy on a
continual basis as the summer of 1961 approached was the President's National Security
Advisor, McGeorge Bundy. Bundy screened most of the Berlin-related material coming into
the Oval Office and, consequently, had a tremendous influence over who and what Kennedy
saw and used in this regard to make his decisions during the crisis. According to David
Halberstam, in his book, The Best and the Brightest, Bundy's job was,
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Keeping the papers moving, reminding the President when a decision was
coming up, occasionally helping to channel a promising young man in State
who might give a slightly different viewpoint to the President, protecting the
President against people who wanted his time but were not worthy of it,
making sure that people who needed his time got it, learning quickly what the
President's tastes, needs, reservations were, always moving things. In his own
words, the traffic cop. 57
"Mac" Bundy was one of President Kennedy's young superstars who had risen to the
top at an early age. Dean of the College at Harvard University at thirty-four years of age, he
was roasted by a Yale colleague with the following limerick:
A proper young prig, McGeorge Bundy,
Graduated from Yale on Monday
But he shortly was seen
As Establishment Dean
Up at Harvard the following Sunday. 58
Bundy served as an officer in the Army during World War II. He worked on some of
the post-war details of the Marshall Plan, was a political analyst for the Council on Foreign
Relations, and wrote speeches for John Foster Dulles in his New York Senate campaign.
Halberstam characterized Bundy as "dashing, bright, brittle, the anti-bureaucratic man, the
anti-conventional man." He described the personal relationship between Bundy and President
Kennedy as something that transcended politics:
Mac Bundy was a good and true Republican... and had voted twice for
Eisenhower, but in the late fifties he began to forge a relationship with Jack
Kennedy, a relationship in which Arthur Schlesinger [active in the 1960
presidential campaign and Special Assistant to the President from 1961 to
1964] served as the main intermediary. Bundy and Kennedy got on well from
the start, both were quick and bright, both hating to be bored or to bore, that
was almost the worst offense a man could commit, to bore. Rationalists, both
of them, one the old Boston Brahmin, the other the new Irish Brahmin, each
anxious to show to the other that he was just a little different from the knee-




jerk reactions of both his background and his party. 59
Up until the Bay of Pigs invasion (17-20 April 1961), President Kennedy ran
something of an "open door policy." That is, he did not have Oval Office visitors strictly
"screened" through a key aide. Robert Kennedy, the President's younger brother and U.S.
Attorney General, in a February 1965 interview with Arthur Schlesinger, stated that, "the
Bay of Pigs and our investigation [after it] stimulated some more-clear-cut lines of authority.
Everybody was going to President Kennedy directly. That was a mistake. Mac Bundy
should have had more primary responsibility to people reporting through him and with
him." 60 President Kennedy corrected this situation almost immediately after the invasion by
adjusting his working relationship with Bundy. Of Bundy, Robert Kennedy stated that
President Kennedy thought he was "competent, " and Robert Kennedy described him as
"brilliant" although he also characterized him as occasionally indecisive. 61
Indecisiveness is not a desirable characteristic of crisis managers and may have limited
Bundy at times from being as strong an influence on the President during crises as he might
otherwise have been. Nonetheless, Bundy had a tremendous effect on the intelligence
analysis which President Kennedy used. Said Halberstam,
Mac was a terrific memo writer, facile, brief and incisive. It was not, as
publication of documents would later prove, exactly something which would
make the literary world envious, but to be a good memo writer in government
was a very real form of power. Suddenly everyone would be working off
Bundy 's memos, and thus his memos guided the action, guided what the
President would see. 62
59
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Bundy, as the President's point man, could have done more to support the efficiency
of the presidential decision making process. His lack of professional rapport with the State
Department and CIA ultimately reduced the effectiveness of key tools in the President's
"crisis management toolbox."
Theodore C. Sorensen. Ted Sorensen was John F. Kennedy's closest aide
throughout the latter's political career and from January 1961 to January 1964, he served as
Special Counsel to the President. Although he dealt primarily in domestic policy, he was
consulted frequently during foreign policy decisions after the Bay of Pigs. Said Robert
Kennedy,
Sorensen 's primary responsibility was domestic matters, but it was like me:
My primary responsibility was domestic matters — I mean, the Department of
Justice — but when the final decision or decisions were going to be made on
some foreign policy matters which had an important effect, we would be
brought in just to give our views or raise questions. 63
Early predictions were that Sorensen and Bundy would clash, but this never occurred
in a significant way. Arthur Schlesinger described Sorensen: "Self-sufficient, taut and
purposeful, he was a man of brilliant intellectual gifts, jealously devoted to the President and
rather indifferent to personal relations beyond his own family." 64 Schlesinger went on to
contrast Sorensen with Kennedy:
Of Sorensen and Kennedy themselves, two men could hardly have been more
intimate and, at the same time, more separate. They shared so much - the
same quick tempo, detached intelligence, deflationary wit, realistic judgment,
candor in speech, coolness in crisis — that, when it came to policy and
speeches, they operated nearly as one.
...speeches, of course, assured [Sorensen] an entry into foreign policy
at the critical points. No one at the White House worked harder or more




carefully; Kennedy relied on no one more... 65
As the debate over what to do in Berlin heated up, Sorensen became directiy involved.
He drafted a memorandum summing up the White House position after Dean Acheson and
Lyndon Johnson began to call for the proclamation of a national emergency after Vienna.
Sorensen drafted the President's 25 July television address on Berlin which made a strong
statement to Khrushchev about the U.S. position: the intent to increase the defense budget
and activate military reserve units. This speech and Khrushchev's reaction to it took the
crisis to a new, higher level.
Maxwell D. Taylor. On 22 April 1961, two days after the Bay of Pigs debacle,
Kennedy called retired General Maxwell Taylor (Army Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959) to
come to Washington and investigate the CIA role in the failed Cuban invasion. General
Taylor had resigned during the Eisenhower Administration due to his opinions of military
strategy which diverged from the current line of thought. At age fifty-nine, he had begun to
settle into a job as the president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York,
as it turned out, this was a short-lived "career". Taylor accepted Kennedy's invitation and
became the Special Military Assistant to the President. 66
Although he had no prior personal relationship with the General, President Kennedy
had been strongly influenced by Taylor's book, The Uncertain Trumpet, which touted the
failure of the defense strategy called Massive Retaliation and described the need for a new
approach called Flexible Response. Coming on the heels of the Eisenhower presidency,
during which he was seen as a strategic dissident, Taylor and his passion for defense reform




the question may well be raised as to whether such a National Military
Program of Flexible Response is really practicable. It is if we will act
promptly. Changes must be made both within the Department of Defense and
in the national attitude and behavior. To start with, the attic of the Department
of Defense has need of thorough housecleaning to throw out many outmoded
concepts, illusions, shibboleths, and fallacies. 67
Taylor's ideas struck home with Kennedy, who as early as 1954, while leading the
fight in the Senate to preserve the Army after the Korean War, had said, "Our reduction of
strength for resistance in so-called brushfire wars, while threatening atomic retaliation, has in
effect invited expansion by the Communists in areas such as Indochina through those
techniques which they deem not sufficiently offensive to induce us to risk the atomic warfare
for which we are so ill prepared defensively." 68
Initially, the President and his brother were hoping to name Taylor as the replacement
for Allen Dulles at CIA, but the General was not interested. He was, however, content to
become the President's Special Military Assistant and chair the investigation into the CIA
failure in Cuba. 69
Maxwell Taylor's confluence of strategic ideas with the President would lead to his
being pulled in on many decisions which transcended strictly military issues. According to
Robert Kennedy, it "was sensitive, but every decision that the President made on foreign
policy was cleared through Maxwell Taylor." 70
Robert Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy, although not technically a member of the
President's White House staff, naturally took on a personally interactive role because he was
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President Kennedy's brother. While serving as the U.S. Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy
was considered by his brother for a number of other positions in the government at various
times, including the Director of the CIA after the Bay of Pigs debacle. Said Bobby Kennedy,
The fact was that we had grown up together and had gone through all these
things. I would be involved. Each person had sort of a different role... I'd
see him when he'd have a Cabinet meeting or a National Security Council
meeting or a meeting on other matters, we'd usually have a talk. That might
be maybe once or twice a day or several times a week — whatever it might be.
I knew what was going on. 71
The first few months of the Administration, Bobby Kennedy was involved with the
press and putting presidential appointees into place. After the Bay of Pigs, he became more
active in White House affairs. Arthur Schlesinger wrote of Bobby Kennedy's role outside of
domestic affairs: "Especially in foreign affairs, if a good idea was going down for the third
time in the bureaucratic sea, one turned more and more to Bobby to rescue it. His distinctive
contribution was to fight unremittingly for his brother's understanding that foreign policy was
not a technical exercise off in a vacuum but the expression of a nation's internal policy and
purpose." 72
Of particular interest regarding intelligence analysis was Bobby Kennedy's personal
relationship with Georgi Bolshakov, an employee of the Russian embassy. Speaking of this
relationship, Kennedy said,
Most of the major matters dealing with the Soviet Union and the United States
were discussed and arrangements were made between Georgi Bolshakov and
myself. He was Khrushchev's representative, so we used to meet maybe once
every two weeks. We used to go over all this: whether the United States
would stand up. We went through Berlin. We were reasonably hopeful about
what would happen on the inspection of nuclear weapons, because he had





think, up to twenty inspection sites in Russia. Of course, when they got to
Vienna, they wouldn't agree. 73
Kennedy was introduced to Bolshakov by an American journalist. For some unknown
reason, the Soviets seemed to want to bypass their own ambassador to the U.S. except for
matters of routine importance. Khrushchev communicated directly with the President through
Bobby Kennedy's relationship with Bolshakov. They talked about whether or not the June
summit should occur, the agenda at the summit, Berlin, conclusions on the control of nuclear
weapons, Laos, Cuba. Specifically, with regard to Berlin, Bobby Kennedy addressed the
importance of the Soviet understanding that the U.S. was indeed committed to Berlin, that
talk of military action was not merely empty rhetoric. Said Kennedy, "I remember I
emphasized to [Bolshakov] continuously that we would go to war on Berlin. He kept saying
that he was sending back that message. Then he said to me afterward he didn't think the
[Soviet] Ambassador was sending messages back." 74
After the Berlin Wall was constructed, the Kennedy-Bolshakov relationship cooled
down. However, regarding American and Russian tanks facing one another down in a tense
confrontation on the Berlin border on 27 October 1961, Kennedy said, "I got in touch with
Bolshakov and said the President would like them to take their tanks out of there in twenty-
four hours. He said he'd speak to Khrushchev, and they took their tanks out in twenty-four
hours. He delivered effectively when it was a matter that was important." 75 The Soviets
stopped the Kennedy-Bolshakov relationship when it became publicized after the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. President Kennedy asked Arthur Schlesinger to join the






staff as a "roving reporter and trouble-shooter," and he had his hands in much of what the
Administration did, albeit most of the time in a marginal way. 76 Robert Kennedy reflected
upon President Kennedy's opinion of Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President from
1961 to 1964:
[My brother] liked Arthur Schlesinger, but he thought he was a little bit of a
nut sometimes. He thought he was sort of a gadfly and that he was having a
helluva good time in Washington. He didn't do a helluva lot, but he was good
to have around. He was a valuable contact, and he's also contributed some
very stimulating, valuable ideas at various times. That made it well
worthwhile. He wasn't brought in on any major policy matters, but he'd work
on drafts of speeches. Also, he used to stimulate people all around the
government by writing them memos, what they should be doing and what they
should be thinking of, and frequently made a lot of sense. I think he was a
valuable addition, Arthur Schlesinger, and I think the President thought so
too.
77
Schlesinger's memoranda, although they may have been thought provoking, may also
have created unnecessary distractions that diffused the decision making process.
Schlesinger's book, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, has been
considered by some to be the definitive account of the Kennedy Administration and of the
events during the Berlin Crisis. However, Hillenbrand contends that, regarding Berlin, it is
"a travesty" and that the actual events have never been published accurately. 78 We
reexamine the facts in the next chapter.
Others. There were others on the staff that played minor roles in the way things got
done around the White House. Here are a few examples:
Kenneth P. O'Donnell was Special Assistant to the President during 1961. His
primary responsibility was as Appointments Secretary. "[JFK] liked Kenny O'Donnell. He
76
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Hillenbrand, telephone interview, 3 March 1997.
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liked being with Kenny. His judgment was good - although frequently he didn't accept it...
Kenny O'Donnell was so loyal to him." 79 Note the continual importance Kennedy placed on
loyalty.
Walt W. Rostow was the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from January
to November 1961. He worked directly for McGeorge Bundy and the President read many
memoranda written by Rostow, especially after Vienna.
Richard N. Goodwin began with the Administration as Assistant Special Counsel to
the President. President Kennedy liked Dick Goodwin but, after the Bay of Pigs invasion,
Goodwin was transferred to the State Department to strengthen it and did not make a major
contribution to the decision making process during the Berlin Crisis.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Generally a major contributor of intelligence analysis as well as the primary source of
all other aspects of the intelligence field, the CIA was conspicuously absent from 1961 Berlin
Crisis activities in the first half of the year. The first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
which was produced on the matter during the Kennedy Administration was dated late April,
after the Bay of Pigs invasion. That was followed by about eight Special National
Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) beginning in June, through the end of the year. The man who
should have been the CIA's personal advocate with the President never established the
necessary productive, professional rapport with the White House.
Allen W. Dulles. President-Elect Kennedy announced that he would retain Allen W.
Dulles as his Director of Central Intelligence upon assuming office. Dulles had a family
tradition of foreign affairs. His grandfather had been Secretary of State under President
79Guthman and Shulman, 419.
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Benjamin Harrison, a post that both Dulles's uncle, Robert Lansing, and his older brother,
John Foster Dulles, also held. Dulles originally entered the diplomatic service in 1916,
serving in a variety of posts abroad and as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Versailles
Peace Conference. After four years as chief of the State Department Division of Near
Eastern Affairs, Dulles resigned from government service in 1926 and worked on Wall Street
as a lawyer for the next fifteen years. 80
During World War II, Dulles headed the Office of Strategic Services mission in
Switzerland and later became a key figure in the establishment of the Central Intelligence
Agency. In 1948, Dulles was given a CIA appointment by President Truman. In 1951, he
was placed in charge of covert operations when he permanently joined the CIA as Deputy
Director for Plans. In February 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Dulles as Director of
Central Intelligence where he flourished until the Bay of Pigs invasion. 81
Ten days after the election, and Kennedy's decision to keep Dulles, the CIA director
flew south to brief the President-Elect.
Allen arrived in Palm Springs to brief the president-elect on the intelligence
matters that he had deliberately withheld from him as a candidate. The setting
by Ambassador Kennedy's swimming pool was familiar from their mellow
previous encounters, but the substance of the discussion this time was different.
On November 18, 1960, Kennedy was briefed for the first time on the CIA's
covert paramilitary planning to overthrow Fidel Castro. 82
When the invasion actually occurred, Dulles was out of the country on a routine
speaking engagement at the Young President's Organization of Puerto Rico. The post-
invasion investigation revealed that Dulles had "lost touch" with the operation as it neared,





that, "He became the Cuban operation's high-level advocate even as he dropped the reins of
the operation itself.
" 83 Said Grose,
The days of April 16 to 20 saw the proud CIA humbled as never before.
Allen "looked like living death," wrote Robert Kennedy in the aftermath. "He
had the gout and had trouble walking, and he was always putting his head in
his hands." Surprisingly, Allen had provided no guiding hand through that
week of crisis; he hovered between helplessness and irrelevance. 84
Said Bobby Kennedy of Allen Dulles, "[the President] liked him. Thought he was a
real gentleman, handled himself well. There were, obviously, so many mistakes made at the
time of the Bay of Pigs that it wasn't appropriate that he should stay on. And he always took
the blame. He was a real gentleman. [JFK] thought very highly of him." 85 President
Kennedy admitted after the Bay of Pigs invasion that he should have gotten rid of Dulles
earlier. Kennedy stated that he needed, "someone there [in CIA] with whom I can be in
complete and intimate contact -- someone from whom I know I will be getting the exact
pitch." 86 In spite of the President's admission, Dulles did not officially resign until 27
September 1961, at which time he was replaced by John Alex McCone who would serve as
the Director of CIA until April of 1965.
Because of the Bay of Pigs failure, Kennedy's reliance on the CIA was significantly
affected. He did not deal directly with Allen Dulles as much over the Berlin Crisis as he
would have had it not occurred. Instead, from April to September of 1961, Dulles busied
himself with the construction of CIA's new "campus" at Langley. It appears that the most




85Guthman and Shulman, 14.
86 Schlesinger, 276.
49
should be signs on the highway openly marking the construction site as the new home of CIA
headquarters. CIA analysis was limited to several NIEs which became a valuable part of the
body of analysis considered by the President during the latter stages of the 1961 decision
making process. However, there was no strong personal advocacy for the IC at the
presidential level during the Berlin Crisis.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
There was discord between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was
also friction between the Chiefs and the new Secretary of Defense. This tension added to the
intensity of the crisis as the President considered his options in Berlin.
The selection of the Secretary of Defense took place in a very roundabout way.
President Kennedy received considerable advice on filling appointments from his father,
Joseph Kennedy Sr. One of the people recommended to the younger Kennedy by his father
was Robert Lovett. Bob Lovett, like McGeorge Bundy, was a Yale graduate. He had been a
naval aviator in World War I, and during World War II he had served on the staff of the
Secretary of War. In 1947, he served as an Undersecretary of State.
Bob Lovett had worked in government with a man named Robert McNamara during
the war. Claimed Lovett, "he had been terrific: disciplined, with a great analytical ability, a
great hunger for facts." 87 Lovett recommended McNamara to Kennedy as the ideal man to
serve at Defense.
Robert S. McNamara. Bob McNamara, Harvard Business School graduate,
professor, lieutenant colonel in the Air Force; he rose to the top at Ford Motor Company and
then turned down a position as president of Ford to take the job as Secretary of Defense.
87 Halberstam, 10.
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Reluctant to leave Ford at first, McNamara was also considered for Secretary of the
Treasury, but when offered a choice, opted for Defense. His acceptance of the appointment
was conditional, based upon the assurance that he would have control over other
appointments at Defense, that although the President would get final approval, no one would
come to Defense without his say so. Early on, President Kennedy considered making his
brother, Bobby, an Undersecretary of Defense but believed that, "the Defense Department
wasn't large enough for both of [their] personalities." 88
Nominally a Repubtican, he backed Kennedy in the election and was supported by the
auto union leadership in Michigan. First referred to by Lyndon Johnson as, "that fellow
from Ford with the Stacomb on his hair, " McNamara was expected by many to develop a
legacy of prestige at Defense, "in part due to [his] tendency, conscious or unconscious, to
usurp the powers of the Secretary of State," which combined with "[Dean] Rusk's tendency
to let him do it. n89 Capitalizing upon his aggressive management style and strong business
background, McNamara zealously wrestled with the Department of Defense bureaucracy, to
the pleasure of some, and the chagrin of others. As Schlesinger wrote, on 1 March 1961,
McNamara mounted his first major assault on the Pentagon, firing a fusillade
of ninety-six questions, each aimed at a specific area, directed to a specific
man and requiring a specific answer by a specific time. He wanted to know
what the military were doing, why they thought they were doing it and whether
there was not a more economical and efficient way of achieving the same
result. No one had asked such questions before; and McNamara' s memoranda
grew sharp as his patience grew short. 90
Bob McNamara was extremely loyal to the President and Kennedy respected and
trusted him. Bobby Kennedy said, "[McNamara] had, of course, his weaknesses like





everybody else, but he was head and shoulders above everybody else. He'd done his
homework; he spoke well; and he worked with the President." 91 President Kennedy
seriously considered moving McNamara to State when Dean Rusk began to disappoint him a
great deal.
92
In fact, he confided in McNamara more than Rusk when it came to matters of
foreign policy. 93 McNamara' s caustic approach to the U.S. military leadership may have
been what was required in 1961. However, his focus on policy and the bureaucracy instead
of expediting the conventional force buildup was not helpful in the first half of 1961.
Ultimately, the fruit of McNamara's labor would not be revealed until the Vietnam War,
when the Defense Department would be shaken to its core.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The most important figure at the Department of State was, of course, the Secretary.
But there were several other actors at State who dealt with the President personally regarding
Berlin. Included among these others were the Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and the U.S. Ambassador at Large.
Much more of the written analysis of the Berlin situation originated in the State Department
than CIA. Dispatches from ambassadors, desk officers, former State Department officials;
they all provided useful intelligence analysis. However, it is evident that disdain for State
Department personnel among Kennedy insiders may have distracted the President's attention
from some of this valuable information or, at a minimum, put a negative spin on what the
President saw of it.
Dean Rusk. The Secretary of State should have played a pivotal role in the Berlin






Crisis. In fact he did, but not in a positive way. From the beginning, things did not go well
for State in 1961. Early in the selection process, it became apparent that, "Bundy did not
like Rusk... intolerant of second-rate minds, and sensing in Rusk something second-rate.
Kennedy's future adviser on national security affairs cast a vote against Rusk, but it was not
important, anyway, since he would be working in the White House and not at State." 94
Said Bobby Kennedy, "I always felt, if you had somebody who was a really good organizer,
you could do something with the State Department. . . What happened, as far as the
Department of State is concerned, is that Dean Rusk didn't organize it..." 95
Bob Lovett, mentioned earlier, had brought Rusk to Kennedy's attention. Little
known by the voters, Rusk was the head of the Rockefeller Foundation and had enjoyed the
confidence of General Marshall in his military days. Lovett considered Rusk a very sound
man but also offered a piece of prophetic advice to President Kennedy: "the relations
between a Secretary of State and his President are largely dependent upon the President.
Acheson, Lovett said, had been very good because Truman gave him complete
confidence." 96
Rusk was Georgia-born and had been a military man; he had served as a colonel in
the China-Burma-India theater. The Kennedy pre-selection investigation into Rusk was far
from exhaustive and the first communications between the new president and Rusk were
discouraging. It was as if Kennedy was looking for a weak Secretary of State. Halberstam
describes the Kennedy-Rusk relationship:
more than any other senior official he was not on the Kennedy wavelength.
There was no intimacy; the President never called him by his first name as he
^Halberstam, 32.




did the other senior officials. The Washington rumormongers, who sensed
these nuances with their own special radar, soon turned on him. They claimed
that Rusk would go, a rumor mill fed by Kennedy's own private remarks
reflecting doubt upon the Secretary. 97
This rocky relationship would not bode well for the Administration during the Berlin
Crisis. In effect, it increased the risk of war for the entire world as it decreased the
effectiveness of one of Kennedy's most powerful crisis management tools, the Department of
State. The first piece of analysis we look at in Chapter 8 was written by the then current
Germany Desk Officer at State. History has proven this paper a sound presentation of
reality. However, due to the poor leadership of the Department of State during presidential
transition, and the dysfunctional relationship between the Secretary and the President, this and
other analysis was not examined closely nor did it receive the kind of strong advocacy in the
Oval Office which would have positively affected the Administration's decision making
process. Bobby Kennedy described the situation:
Well, at the end [the Presidentl was very frustrated with Rusk, who became
rather a weak figure; and where the State Department functioned poorly; where
[Rusk] was not prepared on issues to discuss them fully, or really he had never
done his homework; and where all the important papers that were written ~ the
good ones — were written by [JFK] personally or by people at the White
House. And he really felt, at the end, that the ten or twelve people in the
White House who worked under his direction with Mac Bundy or under Mac
Bundy really performed all the functions of the State Department, except for
the managerial functions of being an ambassador...
...Very few suggestions of policy or position came from the State
Department. And Rusk, when you'd get into any kind of a conference, had
not anticipated problems that would arise and not prepared himself to answer
questions — was frequently unaware of the factual basis for a position and,
really, had not done his homework. A rather weak figure.
The President and I discussed on a number of occasions — particularly
in the last couple of months, after the election -- moving Rusk out, perhaps to
the United Nations, and appointing Bob McNamara Secretary of State. 98
97
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The historical evidence indicates that Rusk's leadership was at fault for not educating
the President more quickly on the nature of the Berlin Crisis which was actually underway
the day Kennedy assumed the presidency.
Foy D. Kohler. The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January
of 1959 until July of 1962, Kohler first began working directly with the President in
February 1961, during a meeting with the German Foreign Minister. He immediately
became a fixture at the President's side during the coming months whenever German issues
were being addressed. However, he was not a Presidential appointee and did not come into
close contact with other members of the White House staff until after the Bay of Pigs
disaster. He was one of "the principals" at the Vienna summit in June. Schlesinger branded
Kohler a "complete Achesonian."" Bobby Kennedy said of Kohler during the 1962
selection process for a new ambassador to the Soviet Union, "I had been involved in a lot of
conferences with Foy Kohler, and I was not impressed with him at all... He gave me the
creeps. I didn't think he'd be the kind of person who could really get anything done with the
Russians." 100
As a career Foreign Service Officer, Kohler should have provided continuity and
institutional knowledge during the presidential transition period. It is difficult to ascertain
whether Kohier put forth the required effort to educate Rusk on the serious nature of the
Berlin Crisis early on. However, his professional relationship with Rusk must be considered
as a possible source of communication breakdown in the analysis process, and consequent
weakness of the presidential decision making process.
Kohler eventually replaced Llewellyn Thompson as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union in July of 1962, in spite of Bobby Kennedy's objections.
"Schlesinger, 383.
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Llewellyn Thompson. The U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union was a significant
actor during the Berlin Crisis as he aggressively communicated from the embassy in Moscow.
"Tommy" Thompson was well respected by the Kennedy administration and his timely
written analysis usually made it across the President's desk. This correspondence was
especially significant during the first few months of the Administration, and just before the
Vienna summit, as Kennedy attempted to get to know Khrushchev through the Ambassador's
inputs. As Bobby Kennedy's relationship with Georgi Bolshakov intensified, Thompson's
inputs were given slightly less consideration but he never lost favor in the Oval Office.
Later, Thompson would return to the U.S. as the Special Advisor on Soviet Affairs to
the Secretary of State and would play a major role during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
Although his relationship with the President would not become very personal until tensions in
Berlin had eased, he was always considered in a positive light. Said Bobby Kennedy,
Tommy Thompson was terrific — very tough — always made a good deal of
sense and, really, was sort of the motivating force behind the idea of giving
the Russians an opportunity to back away, giving them some out [in the Cuban
Missile Crisis]... And [the President] liked Tommy Thompson. This is
obviously influenced by my personal opinion, you know, and I expect it's
based on the conversations that we had. Tommy Thompson he thought was
outstanding. I also thought he was outstanding. He made a major difference.
The most valuable people during the Cuban crisis were Bob McNamara and
Tommy Thompson, I thought. 10 '
Thompson provided much of the insight on Berlin as Vienna approached but, since the
President's perception was not yet one of crisis, and because conflicting viewpoints existed,
this insight was perhaps not considered as soberly as it should have been.
Averell W. Harriman. Although not a major contributor during the Berlin Crisis,




was well respected by the Administration and did provide some insight early on (letters
discussed in Chapter 3). Harriman visited Bonn and Berlin on 6-8 March for talks on a wide
range of subjects, but primarily on NATO. Of President Kennedy's opinion of Harriman,
Bobby Kennedy said, "He didn't think highly, really, of any other people in the State
Department [besides Harrimanl."' 02
CONSULTANTS
Kennedy sought and received advice from many people outside of the Administration
during the course of his presidency, but two stand out during the Berlin Crisis in 1961:
Henry Kissinger and Dean Acheson.
Henry A. Kissinger. A professor at Harvard University's Center for International
Affairs, Kissinger was one of the first writers in the growing cottage industry that built itself
upon the debate behind the strategy for the use of nuclear weapons. Kissinger was one of
many theorists exploring the options which lay between blowing up the world and being too
soft. This young German emigre followed in the footsteps of McGeorge Bundy at Harvard
and traveled back and forth from Cambridge to Washington consulting on European issues, in
his official capacity as a member of the National Security Council Staff to President
Kennedy. The President tried to get Kissinger to move down to Washington, but in June,
Kissinger wrote to Bundy explaining that he felt that there was enough brain power on the
White House staff. 103 Eventually, he took over Bundy's old job as National Security
Advisor for Lyndon Johnson.




Letter, Henry Kissinger to McGeorge Bundy, 5 June 1961, The Berlin Crisis 1958-
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exercise in Berlin and worked independently, and with Arthur Schlesinger, to explore these
diplomatic decisions — primarily to counterbalance Dean Acheson's purely military emphasis.
To negotiate, or not to negotiate, seemed to be the sticking point. Said Schlesinger,
Henry Kissinger observed to Bundy that it was wrong "to have refusal to
negotiate become a test of firmness... Firmness should not... be proved by
seeming to shy away from a diplomatic confrontation. " If Khrushchev would
not accept a reasonable proposal, this, in Kissinger's view, was an argument
for rather than against our taking the initiative. Any other course would see us
"jockeyed into a position of refusing diplomatic solutions," and, when we
finally agreed to discussion, as we inevitably must, it would seem an American
defeat. Diplomacy, Kissinger concluded, was the "necessary corollary to the
build-up.
" ,w
Kissinger's most significant written analysis on Berlin was published in a lengthy
memorandum to the President dated 5 May 1961. It is also significant however that Martin
Hillenbrand states that Kissinger's involvement in the crisis has been "vastly overrated" by
historians.
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Dean G. Acheson. President Kennedy called upon former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson in March of 1961 to undertake special studies of the problems of NATO and
Germany. There were some in the Administration who considered Acheson a "hard-liner,"
and feared that the President might be persuaded to follow an aggressive path. But, as
Schlesinger asserted, "Kennedy considered Acheson one of the most intelligent and
experienced men around and did not see why he should not avail himself of hard' views
before making his own judgments." 106
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He liked him. No, he didn't like him — that's not correct. He respected him
and found him helpful, found him irritating; and he thought his advice was
worth listening to, although not accepted. On many occasions, his advice was
worthless... He was in favor of increasing the number of troops there [in
Berlin] and increasing our buildup. I think that was very instrumental in
turning the Russians back. 107
Dean Acheson, of course, had served as Secretary of State under Harry S Truman
from 1949 to 1953. He was a major architect of U.S. foreign policy in the decade following
World War II. Acheson was aligned with the Adenauer and de Gaulle camps regarding
Berlin which believed that, "Khrushchev was testing Western resolve and the NATO
countries must hold firm on the beleaguered city, no matter the cost."' 08 Acheson and
Adenauer were friends from years gone by and tended to see eye to eye. During his 12-13
April visit to the White House, Chancellor Adenauer warned Kennedy not to negotiate with
the Soviets on Berlin claiming it would only serve to undermine NATO unity. 109
Kennedy also sought Acheson's counsel regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion, but when
Acheson strongly recommended not going through with the landing, the President did not
heed his advice. The 3 April 1961 paper which Acheson wrote on Berlin stirred much debate
in the Departments of Defense and State. It kicked the debate over Flexible Response into
high gear. His advice, "helped fix the debate [over Berlin] for a time in terms of a clear-cut
choice between negotiation and a military showdown." 110 By the early months of 1963,
Acheson had grown tired of the Administration's style of decision making. He complained
that, "They are pretty good at improvising; and... if we must get into trouble, it should be
107 Guthman and Shulman, 19.
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suddenly and unexpectedly, because they do best with this sort of a situation. But God help
us... if they are given any time to think!" 1 "
Acheson was aggressive, but as an outsider, his effect in the policy process was
somewhat distracting. It shifted the Administration's focus onto the military realities of the
situation to the detriment of the diplomatic process. This, combined with Kennedy's weak
knowledge of our national interests in Berlin, hurt the efficiency of the presidential decision
making process.
CONCLUSION
The reader is left to draw his or her own conclusions about these people as
individuals. It is not this paper's objective to draw judgements in this regard, but merely to
observe that this was "the team"; along with the President, this was the decision making unit
during the 1961 phase of the Berlin Crisis. The period of presidential transition was without
doubt incredibly challenging for these individuals. However, this in no way reduced the
responsibility which they shared to support the President during the Berlin Crisis. These
individuals were the final level of intelligence analysis for the President. Any personal
weaknesses which they contributed as members of the team — which were left unaddressed -
reflected directly upon the President, as captain of the ship of state.
The final step in our examination is to observe the team in action.
Brinkley, 196.
• CHAPTER 8 *
THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
We have considered crisis management, intelligence and Kennedy's closest advisors
during the Berlin Crisis in 1961. In light of this foundation, we now pick up where the crisis
background in Chapter 3 left off, and examine some of the intelligence analysis on Berlin
which President Kennedy received, in the order in which he received it. It is apparent from
an examination of archival sources that all of the analysis necessary to make sound decisions
regarding Berlin was available to the Administration before Vienna. Lack of bureaucratic
skill on the new White House team — specifically, poor cooperation with CIA, State and
Defense Department personnel reflected in the dysfunctional professional relationships
presented in the previous chapter — allowed the Soviets to keep the political and diplomatic
initiative throughout 1961 and surprise Kennedy and his Administration with the construction
of the Berlin Wall.
Our examination of the crisis management decision making process is broken down
into subcategories based upon the following periods of time: from Kennedy's inauguration
up to the Bay of Pigs invasion, from the invasion and its aftermath up to the Vienna summit,
from the summit up to the construction of the Berlin Wall, and finally, the period of time
immediately following the construction of the wall during which the crisis subsided.
In January of 1961, despite the availability of some human intelligence, Premier
Khrushchev's intentions were not transparent and were open to conflicting interpretations.
There were "indications that he was committed to pursuing the 'world communist' agenda,
perhaps even more intensely than before: Soviet backing for radical forces in the Third
World, his claims that the balance of forces was moving in favor of the Soviet Union, his
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recourse to threatening language and his apparently simplistic Marxist-Leninist creed." 112
Khrushchev's 1959 Foreign Affairs article and the characterizations Kennedy received from
Ambassadors Harriman and Thompson left many questions. According to Robert Kennedy,
the President did not really come to consider Khrushchev as an "irresponsible person" until
after the Vienna summit in June of 1961. 113 Hillenbrand contends that the Administration
did not take the Berlin Crisis seriously until after Vienna as it was preoccupied first with the
transition to office, and then with the Bay of Pigs invasion and its aftermath. 114
Herein lies the problem: the President did not view the situation as a crisis — i.e., he
initially did not have the perception of a "dangerously high probability of war." By referring
to the Snyder-Deising model back in Chapter 2, we see that, according to our national
interests in Berlin, which had been defined by the State Department's 20 December 1958
statement ("Statement Setting Forth the Legal Right of the United States to Access to and
Presence in Berlin"), the U.S. was headed for a dangerous confrontation in January 1961
when Khrushchev renewed his threat of the separate peace treaty. Notwithstanding the
Snyder-Deising definition, it is clear that regardless of Kennedy's perception, the crisis was
real. Because this clash of interests was not immediately recognized, and effectively brought
to the President's attention, the crisis was allowed to grow until Vienna. After Vienna, and
partly as a result of Kennedy's Bay-of-Pigs-inspired convictions, the reality of the crisis was
finally recognized by Kennedy and his Administration. However, Kennedy's reaction to this
recognition was to create an unwieldy, ad hoc analysis machine that did not contribute to the
efficient decision making which is key to effective crisis management. Consequently, he was
surprised by the Wall. Let us look at how this crisis unfolded.
1,2
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FROM INAUGURATION TO INVASION
Thanks to the success of the CIA's U-2 spy plane program, the presence of a "missile
gap" was estimated to be highly unlikely. 115 Nonetheless, uncertainty haunted the new
Administration. Kennedy needed more information before he could choose the best policy
option for Berlin. And so the learning process began, with the crisis already in progress.
Some of the early analysis provided to the President on the situation in Berlin was
published in December 1960, in a RAND Corporation paper (Research Memoranda 2689)
entitled "Military Power and the Cold War: Case of West Berlin." This paper, although
somewhat general in scope, supported the Administration's move toward Flexible Response.
It suggested that political "and cold-war benefits do not flow automatically from military
power. Military strength must be exploited skillfully and judiciously to yield maximum
benefits." Further it stressed leverage tactics stating that the defender in the case of
"diplomatic blackmail" (i.e., Khrushchev's separate treaty ultimatum) should indicate a
readiness to expand the arena of conflict if need be. 116 Instead of providing any useful
intelligence analysis, the RAND paper was a good example of a theoretical approach which
fell short of meeting the Administration's need for practical information.
Martin Hillenbrand, a Foreign Service Officer who had served as the Mission Director
in Berlin since 1958, was the Germany Desk Officer for the State Department in 1961. He
wrote a concise yet comprehensive paper (dated 10 January 1961) on the Berlin "problem"
which was routed to the White House by mid January as a part of the State Department's
transition package for the new Administration. Although there was a considerable historical
115 Grose, 473.
116 A. L. George, "Military Power and the Cold War: Case of West Berlin," (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 26 December 1960), 35, 38, "Germany-Berlin General,
Military Power and the Case of West Berlin 12/26/60" folder, National Security Files, box
81, JFKL.
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file on Berlin, this paper constituted the most current, thorough written advice which
President Kennedy may have received upon entering office. It is impossible to determine
whether the President actually read this paper in January, but Hillenbrand recalls giving it to
Rusk around the January time frame as Rusk was making his preparations to assume his
position as Secretary of State. 117 The paper was filed in the January 1961 National Security
Files at the JFK Library indicating that it did in fact find its way into the hands of the White
House staff. Later versions of the same paper, which basically restated the summary
conclusions of the January edition, were published in March of 1961. I18
The paper described the challenges ahead for Kennedy's decision making process and
is worthy of detailed examination. In the paper, Hillenbrand effectively described all of the
perceived negotiating options available to President Kennedy. He characterized the situation
as follows,
whenever it suits their purposes, the Soviets and the East Germans can again
precipitate an active crisis and restore Berlin to the front pages of the world
press. We can live with the status quo in Berlin but can take no real initiative
to change it for the better. To a greater or lesser degree, the Soviets and East
Germans can, whenever they are willing to assume the political consequences,
change it for the worse. 119
Hillenbrand criticized the then current Berlin policy, describing the city as, "an exclave which
is militarily indefensible and which can only be maintained, under lessening conditions of
credibility, by the ultimate threat of thermonuclear war. Critics of Western policy castigate it
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for immobility, lack of imagination, and failure to seize the initiative." 120 He
recommended that the U.S. "review the status" of Berlin as well as "the approaches
realistically open to us.
"
Hillenbrand began his discussion by listing what he believed were the possible Soviet
objectives in Berlin. He offered two theories: "(a) that the Soviets are using Berlin
essentially as a lever to achieve their wider purpose of obtaining recognition of the GDR and
consolidation of the satellite bloc, or (b) that West Berlin is a primary objective in itself
because its continuance in its present form is so harmful to the East that it must be
eliminated." 121 He contended that the truth probably lay somewhere in between. He
characterized West Berlin's role as, "a channel for the flow of refugees, as a center of
Western propaganda and intelligence activities, and as a show window which daily and
dramatically highlights the relative lack of success in the East..." 122
If one carries Hillenbrand's thoughts to their logical conclusion, one sees that the
biggest practical problem that the Soviets had with Berlin was the refugee flow. Despite the
very real possibility of miscalculation, all evidence pointed to the idea that the Soviets did not
want to undertake military action which might lead to war. Securing the border in Berlin was
a rational Soviet solution which was never given serious consideration by the Administration.
Interestingly enough, the New York Herald Tribune would later report on 23 August 1961,
that the Communist plan to seal the border in this fashion had been known to
the Allies since 1958 and had been dubbed 'Operation Chinese Wall' by U.S.
and West German intelligence agents. An East German government aide
defecting to West Berlin in July 1958 had brought along a document describing
the plan, which called initially for a barbed-wire barrier, then its replacement








copy of the plan had been turned over to U.S. agents by Mayor Brandt, who
was reported to have given little weight to the plan because (a) the defector had
said the U.S.S.R. had vetoed it and (b) Brandt thought the Western Allies
would be sure to challenge such a violation of the 4-power occupation
agreement. 123
Hillenbrand began his review of the status of Berlin by discussing the development of
the "problem," asserting that it had gone through four broad phases. The first began
immediately following the Soviet note of November 1958, and lasted until the Geneva
Conference of Foreign Ministers in May 1959. It was during this period that the Western
powers drew up their peace plan and "made considerable progress in their contingency
planning." The second phase followed the Geneva conference. During this phase, the West
agreed to discuss Berlin outside the context of German reunification. Both the West and the
Soviets advanced proposals for "interim arrangements." Neither side accepted the other's
proposals. The third phase occurred between the September 1959 Camp David talks and the
collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting in May 1960. The fourth and final phase, according to
Hillenbrand, went from the aborted summit up to the 1960 U.S. presidential election, during
which time the Soviets postponed their "threatened unilateral action pending the inauguration
of a new American administration...by the end of 1960 the situation in and about Berlin had
returned to as near normal as it ever gets."
Hillenbrand described the current policy as a "holding operation" that had been
successful due to the uncertainty of U.S. willingness to risk thermonuclear war. From this,
rationality on the part of Khrushchev is implied, and one can reason that he was sincere about
his desires to avoid war. Hillenbrand lamented the fact that, among the Western allies, the
U.S. had provided much of the initiative. He stated that, "since the collapse of the Summit,
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lie Western emphasis has been largely on refinement of contingency planning... and there has
)een little further discussion of the substance of the position which the Western Powers might
ake into future negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin." 124 He voiced the expectation that
he British and the French would approach the U.S. regarding negotiations by the end of the
nonth. As far as Khrushchev was concerned, Hillenbrand expected him to push for the
'Free City of West Berlin" proposal as a starting point to any negotiations. Throughout the
;ourse of 1961, Hillenbrand's position was consistent. He always believed that negotiations
Tom a strong (albeit ambiguous) position were key to diffusing the crisis. 125
Next in the paper, Hillenbrand began to discuss the formulation of the Western
x)sition for 1961. He stressed the need to do something soon, to create, "a proper
isychological framework for discussion of the Berlin question." His thoughts supported the
>erception of the need to shift from the strategy of Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response,
)ut they also described a situation in which the U.S. had the opportunity to seize the
nitiative. Unfortunately, history shows the failure of the Kennedy Administration to do so in
t timely manner. As Hillenbrand stated,
It is fair to assume... that the Soviets do not wish to see the United States
mobilize its resources behind a greatly enhanced defense program of the type
which accompanied the war in Korea, when we quadrupled our defense
expenditures. A warning, therefore, that continuation of the Soviet threat to
Berlin will evitably bring the kind of massive mobilization of American
resources for defense of which Khrushchev knows we are capable, but which
neither we nor he basically desire, might provide a useful prelude to any
negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin. 126
Hillenbrand then listed and described what he saw as the nine "conceivably possible"
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Berlin Crisis negotiating options which are summarized briefly below:
Option 1: All-German "Sweetening" for Some Interim Arrangement on Berlin.
This option consisted of finding a way to make the Soviets believe they were moving toward
one of their two possible objectives listed above (i.e., the recognition of the GDR or the
capture of West Berlin.) Hillenbrand listed four ways in which this might be accomplished:
a) Enhance the status of the GDR, making it a de facto entity to deal with the West,
perhaps sweetening the 28 July 1959 Geneva proposals by permitting all-German talks under
the cover of a Four-Power Group.
b) Change the Western peace plan, extending the time period from seven to ten years
to prove to the Soviets that there would not be a showdown by free elections for an extended
period, while the Mixed German Committee provided for in the peace plan presumably would
be in operation.
c) Reduce troops in Germany and/or place limits on West German armament. This
idea might at least convince Khrushchev to postpone Soviet action while it was being
explored.
d) Keep the possibility open to consideration as a tactical expedient, despite French
and German objections, of expressing willingness to discuss the principles of a peace treaty
with Germany, to the extent that it might tip the balance in favor of preventing Soviet
unilateral action against the Western position in Berlin.
Hillenbrand asserted that, "it is doubtful whether any of the foregoing [four] ideas
would really contribute much in a practical sense to the process of achieving German
reunification though ostensibly related thereto."'27
Option 2: Temporary Geneva-Type Arrangements. This option consisted of a
Ibid., 8.
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proposal for an interim arrangement on Berlin to last tor a specified number of years which
might conceivably proceed along the lines of the Western proposals at Geneva of 28 July
1959, perhaps with certain modifications or additions. In the course of the presentation of
this option, Hillenbrand suggested that,
the idea that the West is in a position to improve its situation in Berlin to any
marked degree hardly seems realistic, although this consideration has not
deterred the Germans and the Berliners from making rather far-reaching
proposals for Western demands to be made during negotiations, the
achievement of which would constitute a major diplomatic defeat for the
Soviets in a situation where they admittedly negotiate from a position of
geographical and tactical strength. 128
Option 3: All-Berlin Proposal. This option was submitted primarily for "tactical
and propaganda reasons" as it was considered nonnegotiable with the Soviets.
Option 4: Guaranteed City. This option was described as,
perhaps the most acceptable arrangement on Berlin which can be devised
involving a change of juridical basis for the Western presence in the city... In
essence, it involved agreement by the Four Powers to guarantee the security of
Western military and civil access to West Berlin, with the Western Powers
agreeing simultaneously to suspend the exercise of their occupation rights so
long as the agreement was otherwise being observed. 129
Hillenbrand predicted that this option "would probably cause a political crisis within the
Western alliance, since it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and loss of
determination to maintain our position in Berlin." 130
Option 5: Solution C of the April 1959 London Working Group Report.








if an impasse had been reached at the conference and it seemed that the Soviets
would proceed to take unilateral action purporting to end their responsibilities
in the access field, the Western Powers might wish to consider making a
proposal involving a series of interlocking but unilateral declarations on Berlin
access aimed at achieving a freezing of existing procedures, with ultimate
Soviet responsibility being maintained, although implementation might be by
the East German authorities... [Hillenbrand considered it] unwise to open any
negotiation with the Soviets by putting forward solution C. If used at all, it
would seem most effective as a fallback position after a process of elimination
of other possibilities has taken place. 131
Option 6: Tacit Temporary Freeze. This option's objective was to forestall, with
some sort of holding action, unilateral action by the Soviets until after the German elections
in September 1961. Hillenbrand stated that this approach, "may no longer have much
relevance in view of what seems to be Soviet determination to resolve the Berlin question in
1961." 132
Option 7: Delaying Action Without Specific Substantive Arrangement. This
option was submitted as not having much relevance to the situation in 1961.
Option 8: Mitigated Breakdown of Negotiations. This option was put forward as
an attempt to preserve the essentials of the Western position without a new agreement. Its
primary focus was to avoid a major crisis or blow to Western prestige.
Option 9: Complete Breakdown of Negotiations with the Soviets. The final
option presented was to cope with the eventuality that the Soviets will sign a peace treaty
with the GDR and turn over all checkpoint controls to the GDR authorities. It meant putting
contingency plans into action. Hillenbrand left the outcome of the execution of this option
open to speculation.
In conclusion, Hillenbrand despaired that the, "history of the Berlin crisis since






which, under current circumstances, will prove acceptable to both East and West." 133 He
drove home the support for Flexible Response by saying that, "A vital component of the
Western position is the maintenance of a credible deterrent against unilateral Soviet action.
Without this the full geographic weaknesses of the Western position in Berlin will have
decisive weight in any negotiation. Thought should be given to the possibility of other
deterrents than the pure threat of ultimate thermonuclear war." 134
The Hillenbrand paper is significant for several reasons other than merely as a
summary of negotiating options. First, it most clearly defined the State Department's
estimate of Soviet intentions in Germany - an intelligence analysis of sorts. Second, it stated
quite clearly that, not only was the West operating from a geopolitical deficit in Berlin vis a
vis the Soviets, but the U.S. had become the de facto leader of the Alliance in Berlin, and if
Western interests were to be served there, the U.S. would have to lead the way - i.e., the
President needed to act soon. Third, the action required was a conventional force build up to
seize the initiative, accompanied by negotiations. Hillenbrand did not clearly identify the best
U.S. negotiating position, for as he now admits, there was no good position. 135
A weakness of Hillenbrand's paper was the failure to distinguish between the idea of
Berlin as a "problem" as opposed to a "crisis." As discussed already, the President's actions
show that he also considered Berlin a "problem." A universal principle emerges here: the
hesitancy to use strong language in written analysis ~ to get the point across — is a disservice
to senior decision makers. They do not have time to read between the lines. Only succinct,
candor can cut through the fog of overwhelming information which unavoidably fills the
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nor does diplomacy among statesmen of the same country.
In an "airgram" to Secretary of State Rusk dated 24 January 1961, Ambassador
Thompson detailed a conversation he had with Khrushchev on 21 January. Thompson was
careful to describe as much of the conversation as possible in an effort not only to pass
information, but to provide the Secretary of State (and of course the President who also
received a copy of the airgram) with analysis of Khrushchev's personal character. Thompson
was direct with Khrushchev and told him that, "What worried the West was not economic
and social organization, but concern that [the] Soviet Union itself desired to dominate the
world with Communism as [a] means to this end." 136 Thompson cited Hungary as an
example. Khrushchev seemed to downplay Western concerns but expressed a strong desire to
improve trade relations with the West, saying that this would in turn improve political
relations. He blamed the U.S. for not allowing these trade relations to develop. It appears
that Khrushchev was operating from a "wait and see" perspective, uncertain as to how to deal
with the new U.S. administration. Finally, Thompson concluded with a comment on
Khrushchev's physical state, saying that he, "seemed reasonably well but there were some
signs that he had felt the strain of the long debates in the Central Committee Plenum." 137
An important concept to recognize with regard to the presidential decision making
process here is that the two leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev, had begun posturing. They
were trying to get a feel for how the other would behave in the days to come. Neither leader
had reached a conclusion yet about the character of the other. Recall Harriman's
characterization of Khrushchev as a "realist" (Chapter 3). With the Hillenbrand paper in
mind, it is reasonable to suspect that Kennedy was thinking along the lines of, "how can I
136





contain Khrushchev?" and Khrushchev was thinking, "how far can I push Kennedy?" These
questions personified the very nature of the conflict inherent between the Soviet and U.S.
regimes, as well as the conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs.
On 28 January, Secretary of State Rusk sent President Kennedy a chronology of
events in Berlin with a one page cover memo attached. It is significant that although
Hillenbrand's detailed analysis was available, Rusk apparently chose to give the President the
most basic analytical product available and informed the President that a "full brief" was
forthcoming. Details of this brief are unknown.
On 30 January, the Secretary of State received a telegram from Ambassador
Thompson. 138 The primary concern expressed by Ambassador Thompson was that
intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities were being exaggerated by U.S. military
intelligence. Further, that this overestimate, "has resulted from the natural tendency [of] our
military to assess [an] enemy's capabilities at [a] maximum as may be only prudent from this
point of view." 139 Without citing evidence, Thompson stressed the need to continue to
concentrate on a "second-strike capability and make clear [to the Soviets that we are] doing
so."
140 Thompson expressed concern over the accuracy of intelligence estimates of Soviet
military capabilities and said that these affect our "(1) estimate [of] their intentions in [the]
political field, (2) formulation [of] our own policies to meet our estimate of their capabilities
and intentions and (3) our estimate [of] their reactions [to] our policies and actions."
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Thompson went on to say that,
among other things I think regarding) (1) that because of emphasis on danger
in [the] military field we have tended [to] underestimate [the] seriousness of
[the] threat in [the] political. Regarding] (2) I think we sometimes react in [a]
military way to Soviet political objectives. Regarding] (3) if [the] Soviets
[are] as relatively weak militarily as I suspect, their reaction to SAMOS,
attitude toward inspection, etc., would be quite different than if they are as
strong as we give them credit for. .
.
It may be that we need two estimates of Soviet military capabilities, one for
purely military use in determining our own defense needs, and [the] other as
[a] basis for policy determinations, particularly in [the] political field, in which
case we could be more realistic and not allow such wide margins for security
reasons.
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This input from Thompson identified the need for the Administration to go beyond
military intelligence for information on Soviet capabilities and to use multiple estimates to
insure accuracy. It foreshadowed Kennedy's dissatisfaction with the military establishment
during the Bay of Pigs invasion and played into the post-invasion changes that would be
initiated after that failure. It also foreshadowed Kennedy's request for analysis from Acheson
and Kissinger, but did not explain the failure to use Intelligence Community (IC) analysis
from State, DOD, and CIA first. In separating political and military efforts, Thompson's
assessment meshed nicely with Hillenbrand's emphasis on an approach combining
conventional force buildup and negotiations. Using worst case scenarios, or as Thompson put
it, "assessing Soviet military capabilities at a maximum," caused problems as discussed in
Chapter 5. Used for planning purposes, worst case scenarios necessarily become more bleak
as confidence in intelligence decreases. One can deduct from Thompson's telegram, and the





Between February and March, it appears that President Kennedy began to go outside
the government for advice, perhaps prompted by the Thompson telegram. This effort was
another indication of low confidence in the current sources of intelligence analysis. One of
the first people whom Kennedy sought out was a professor from Harvard University's Center
for International Affairs, Henry Kissinger, whom he temporarily "deputized" as a member of
the National Security Council staff. Dr. Kissinger went to Washington in mid March for a
series of briefings by the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Defense to "read
into the problem. " The second outsider of stature whom Kennedy consulted was former
President Eisenhower's Secretary of State (1949-1953), Dean Acheson. We examine the role
of these two men later.
Five days after the 30 January telegram, Thompson sent another telegram to Secretary
of State Rusk, specifically addressing U.S. options in Berlin and his own estimates of Soviet
political intentions. In it he said,
I believe Soviet interests as such lie rather in [the] German problem as [a]
whole than Berlin. [The] Soviet Union [is] interested in [the] stabilization [of]
their western frontier and Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, particularly
East Germany which [is] probably most vulnerable. [The] Soviets [are] also
deeply concerned with German military potential and fear West Germany will
eventually take action which will face them with [a] choice between world war
or retreat from East Germany. Even if [the] Berlin question were settled to
Soviet satisfaction, [the] problem of Germany would remain [a] major issue
between East and West. [The] Berlin question [is] nevertheless of great current
importance because:
1) It is [a] convenient and forceful means of leverage for [the] Soviets;
2) Khrushchev's prestige [is] personally involved;
3) [The] Soviets [are] under some pressure from [the] Ulbricht regime [in East
Germany]
;
4) [The] present situation in Berlin threatens [the] stability of [the] East
German regime because of its use as [an] escape route, base for espionage and
propaganda activities, etc.
Soviet proposals on Berlin [are] designed [to] enable [the] East German regime
eventually to acquire it or as minimum completely neutralize it, while to some
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extent saving face for [the] West. 143
Thompson declared that it was, "Impossible to assess with any degree [of] accuracy
Khrushchev's present intentions." He went on, however, to predict that if there was some
activity on the German problem that might indicate possibilities for after the September
elections, Khrushchev might not bring Berlin to a head in 1961. If there was no progress
however, Thompson believed that Khrushchev would proceed with a separate peace treaty
which would bring about, "a highly dangerous situation and one which could get out of
control." He made his case for Hillenbrand's "All-German 'Sweetening '/interim
arrangement" option, saying that it would gain time for both sides. Note that the Thompson
telegram points out very plainly that the Soviets' perceived the need to secure the border in
Berlin — at a minimum. Note also however that Thompson refers to Berlin as either a
"problem," a "question," or a "situation."
On 17 February, the President, Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Kohler, and others
met with Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Germany's Foreign Minister. Brentano expressed his
opinion that the Soviets, "will hesitate to take any drastic steps with regard to Berlin as long
as they know the Western Allies will not tolerate any such steps." 144 The President's
remarks during this meeting made it clear that he believed the Soviets would strive to sign a
separate peace treaty, and then resort to further and more drastic action at a later date — this
despite the advice which he had received that the Soviets did not want to get into an
uncontrollable military conflict over the city. Although Foreign Minister Brentano considered
"more drastic action" a danger, "he appeared to feel very strongly that there would be no
143 Telegram, Llewellyn Thompson to Secretary Rusk, 4 February 1961, The Berlin Crisis
1958-1962 [microform].
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States, 9.
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action on the part of the Soviets as long as they knew that the Allies would not stand for any
disruption of the present Berlin arrangement."' 45 From Kohler's memo, it is clear that
President Kennedy dominated this meeting from the U.S. side and that Secretary Rusk played
i much more minor role. It is also clear that the President was convinced that "drastic Soviet
iction," a worst case scenario, was highly probable despite advice to the contrary. With the
jepth of the President's convictions in mind, two things are puzzling. First, why did
Secretary Rusk not provide more immediate and aggressive support to follow up on the Berlin
ssues? Second, why, if Kennedy's convictions about Soviet intentions were sincere, did the
President not initiate the conventional military forces buildup process right away?
Ten days later (27 February), Secretary Rusk advised Ambassador Thompson to
nform Khrushchev that the U.S. was in the process of consulting with allies and that "in due
:ourse" would put forward its ideas. 146 Rusk stated that it, "would not be possible for [the]
U.S. to contemplate a change in city in regard to our rights and position in Berlin which
tfould represent material change for [the] worse in [the] Western position in that city or
iccess thereto."
147
On 9 March, Thompson met with Khrushchev for three hours to deliver a letter from
President Kennedy and to conduct a general discussion. It was during this meeting that
[Chrushchev called West Berlin a "bone in the throat of Soviet-American relations." 148
Expressing confidence in Soviet economic growth however, he again stressed that the
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peace treaty.
The next day, the President and Foy Kohler met with the German Ambassador,
Wilhelm G. Grewe. Ambassador Grewe commented on a memorandum his government had
received from the Soviets on 17 February, stating their desire for a separate peace treaty and
the desire to pursue the "free city" approach to Berlin. Grewe stated that he believed the
memorandum was not a significant change in the Soviet stance and that he did not believe it
should be interpreted as an ultimatum. He then expressed the Federal Republic of Germany's
interest in U.S. press reports of a change in U.S. military strategy (Flexible Response). 149
Ambassador Grewe's outlook, although diplomatic, may have contributed to the malaise that
was at work in the presidential decision making machinery.
On 13 March, the President and Foy Kohler met with Willy Brandt, the Governing
Mayor of Berlin. Regarding the status of Berlin, Mayor Brandt told the President that,
he thought the critical date to keep one's eye on was the October Congress of
the Soviet Communist Party. He believed that Khrushchev might feel the need
of some kind of action favorable from his point of view prior to that meeting.
In reply to the President's question as to what the nature of such action might
be the Mayor expressed the opinion that it would probably not be in the form
of a serious military confrontation. However, Khrushchev might decide to go
ahead with his program to conclude a separate peace treaty with the
"GDR." 150
Mayor Brandt stressed the fact that Berlin was an "escape hatch" to the West. He also
expressed his thoughts that the East German Army might not stick with the Soviets if they
made a "significant move on Berlin." Again, we see the border problem given legitimacy
and a Soviet "move on Berlin" dubbed unlikely.
In a 16 March telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Ambassador Thompson





again expressed the need for the President to use negotiations to "defer showdown" in Berlin.
He stated that, "If we expect [the] Soviets to leave [the] Berlin problem as is, then we must
at least expect [the] East Germans to seal off [the] sector boundary in order [to] stop what
they must consider intolerable continuation [of the] refugee flow through Berlin." 151
Further, Thompson stressed that the refugee flow to the West was disadvantageous to the
West in many respects as well. He stated that inaction would, in effect, be choosing between
two alternatives: allowing a separate peace treaty to occur, or taking positive steps to prevent
it. He asked the question which he believed should be posed to Chancellor Adenauer during
the latter' s upcoming visit, "What action does [Adenauer] propose we take if East Germans
close [the] sector boundary and what would [the] West Germans do?" 152 Once again, the
U.S. advisor closest to Khrushchev gave candid advice to the Secretary of State with no
apparent response.
On 24 March, Undersecretary of State George McGhee forwarded a paper to
McGeorge Bundy which was basically a revised version of the Hillenbrand paper. He related
that individual studies were being done on the various negotiating options listed in the paper.
Although not a major actor during the Berlin Crisis, George McGhee was a controversial
figure among the President's inner circle and was particularly disliked by Bobby Kennedy.
This personal conflict is yet another good example of the weak rapport between the White
House and the State Department which plagued the U.S. during 1961. Said Bobby Kennedy
of George McGhee 's responsibility as the primary administrator at State,
George McGhee was over there and he was supposed to do that, but he was
useless. In every conversation you had with him, you couldn't possibly
understand what he was saying. I was involved with him a good deal in 1962,
'"Telegram, Llewellyn Thompson to Secretary Rusk, 16 March 1961, Foreign Relations




and it was just impossible. Finally, I talked to the President at his birthday. I
guess it was '62. He said, "If you feel so strongly" -- George McGhee was a
good friend of Dean Rusk ~ "why don't you go see Dean Rusk and ask him to
get rid of him?" 153
Bobby Kennedy took the President's suggestion and McGhee was eventually "shipped off."
As mentioned earlier, between February and July 1961, Kennedy sought former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson's advice on Berlin. Acheson emphasized the need for a
military response, and downplayed a diplomatic one. He believed negotiations would weaken
the NATO alliance. Acheson's memorandum to President Kennedy dated 3 April 1961
advised that:
Decisions and preparations to meet this crisis should be made at the
earliest possible date.
Berlin is of great importance. It is more than probable, and approaches
certitude, that if the United States accepted a Communist take-over of Berlin —
under whatever face-saving and delaying device — the power status in Europe
would be starkly revealed and Germany, and probably France, Italy and
Benelux, would make the indicated adjustments. The United Kingdom would
hope that something would turn up. It wouldn't.
If the USSR is not to dominate Europe, and, by doing so, dominate
Asia and Africa also, a willingness to fight for Berlin is essential. Economic
and political pressures will not be effective; they would degrade the credibility
of the United States commitment to NATO. Nor would threatening to initiate
general nuclear war be a solution. The threat would not carry conviction; it
would invite a preemptive strike; and it would alienate allies and neutrals alike.
The fight for Berlin must begin, at any rate, as a local conflict. The problem
is how and where will it end. This uncertainty must be accepted. 154
In bold contrast to what Kennedy had received up to that point, Acheson's analysis of Berlin
confidently castigated proponents of negotiations and introduced the singular conviction that
the Administration needed to take specific military measures immediately to prepare for what
might be an inevitable confrontation. Of note, he also referred to Berlin as a "crisis." Recall
153 Guthman and Shulman, 10.
154 Memorandum, Dean Acheson to President Kennedy, 3 April 1961, "Germany-Berlin
General 4/61" folder, National Security Files, box 81, JFKL.
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that this advice came two weeks prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, an operation which
Acheson had condemned in advance. Tension in the White House must have been rising
steadily with the implication that military conflict over Berlin was becoming more likely.
Acheson went on matter-of-factly to make military force recommendations:
Doubts about an air operation arise from lack of any clear idea of what
it seeks to or, if successful, will achieve...
A ground operation presents advantages and opportunities. It also
presents grave dangers of escalation and of the Western force being destroyed
or cut off — especially if and when the Elbe has been crossed. If undertaken it
should be by a considerable force. A battalion is too small. It can be stopped,
defeated or captured without disclosing any of the intentions or achieving any
of the results desired. Its only merit seems to be in the fact that this is as far
as the British have been willing to plan. This is not adequate justification. An
armored division, with another division in reserve, is a wholly different matter.
This is a formidable force. It raises the most difficult questions for the other
side. It cannot be stopped without military action. It can take care of itself
against East German or token Soviet opposition. It can raise the issue of
determined Russian resistance without the certainty of disaster, if it occurs. If
it succeeds, a real accomplishment will have been registered. It should begin
its operation without tactical nuclear weapons, and without any great air
assistance until the latter may be needed...
Both air and land operations are in urgent need of more professional
study, which I shall ask to have undertaken. 155
Administration advisors argued that "in emphasizing the worst case and military
3ptions, [Acheson] failed to address Khrushchev's political demands, neglected lesser
:ontingencies and the option of defusing the crisis through negotiation, and risked provoking
in uncontrollable escalation of threat and counter-threat." 156 Administration opinion
migrated into two camps: "hawks" were predisposed to clarity and confrontation, "owls"
were fully aware of the uncertainty and dangers of unintended war and of foreclosing options.
Note that there appeared to be no "doves". In effect, the Acheson advice came off as






had received up to that point.
Regardless of the strengths or weaknesses of Acheson's advice, it began a trend away
from political theory toward a more somber view of the reality of a military conflict between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. -- only a matter of days before a U.S. -planned covert operation
was to take place in Cuba. Acheson's advice, with its strong criticism of negotiations, was in
such contrast to the State Department's advice, that it stymied the Administration. Acheson
was a persuasive man with a strong personality and much experience. He was difficult for
the President to ignore. He would be even more difficult to ignore when the upcoming U.S.
performance in Cuba would prove his advice on that endeavor to have been correct in all
respects.
On 5 April, Henry Kissinger recommended to the White House that the President visit
Berlin to show his personal interest in the situation. On that same day, President Kennedy
and a large delegation, including the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense among
others, met with British Prime Minister MacMillan. Dean Acheson presented his views to
the group. His ideas dominated the discussion: the U.S. needed to prepare for military
action to test Soviet will in Berlin. There was general agreement that the allies had nothing
to bring to the table with which to negotiate. Acheson asserted that Khrushchev was trying to
divide the allies and that the real problem was reunifying Germany. Upon Lord Home's
statement that the right of conquest was wearing thin in Berlin, Acheson suggested that
perhaps it was Western power which was wearing thin. 157
The next day, the talks with the British Prime Minister continued. It was agreed that
there was no bargaining position and Foy Kohler advised that the U.S. should do everything
possible not to have to negotiate on Berlin. President Kennedy contended that, on the
'"William C. Burdett, "Memorandum of Conversation," Foreign Relations of the United
States, 36-40.
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contrary, a negotiating position did need to be developed, and Acheson's suggestions needed
to be considered. However, Kohler pointed out that every conceivable plan had been "staffed
out," that developing a negotiating position was not the problem. He lamented the fact that
there was no satisfactory solution. 158 It is apparent that Acheson's views had influenced
Kohler.
Martin Hillenbrand was not present at the meetings with the Prime Minister. It
appeared however, that the President was beginning to take the Hillenbrand view, despite
Acheson's analysis and Kohler's reservations. In a telephone interview conducted on 14
March 1997, Hillenbrand expressed that Kohler eventually acquiesced to the need for
negotiations as well, not to allow the Soviets to make gains, but to "draw the situation out,"
diffusing tensions. This contradicted Schlesinger's characterization of Kohler as a "complete
Achesonian," and eventually became the party line at the State Department from Rusk on
down. It is noteworthy that during this period of the debate, the seriousness of the refugee
problem was discussed only briefly, practically as an afterthought.
By this time, reports of an impending invasion of Cuba had begun to leak to the press,
and on 7 April 1961, the day after the MacMillan visit, Castro issued a call to arms. Conrad
Adenauer was scheduled to visit Washington in five days. The radar scope was beginning to
clutter.
At this juncture, President Kennedy began an earnest attempt to establish the
commitment to which each of the allies had agreed in the event a formal blockade of Berlin
might be undertaken by either the Soviets or the East Zone. Although the distraction of Cuba
was intense, allied commitment was foremost in Kennedy's mind during meetings with




Chancellor informed President Kennedy that Germany, "was prepared to do everything that
appeared necessary in the interest of this joint cause.'" 59 Foreign Minister Brentano
estimated that the Soviets would not conduct another blockade but believed that they would
sign a separate peace treaty turning over the GDR to the puppet East German government.
He believed that contingency plans needed to proceed with this eventuality in mind. There
was protracted discussion of the confusing points of international law regarding Berlin,
primarily focusing on the threat to access. 160
It is interesting that although the bulk of the analysis received to this point indicated
that the Soviets were not interested in a military confrontation, the principal actors began to
get bogged down in the worst case scenario of a Soviet move in Berlin. The idea that a
separate peace treaty was inevitable and that this would constitute a Soviet gain which would
eventually be followed by further aggressive gestures became accepted as a fait accomplis.
So, although the Administration's remarks began to indicate that there was in fact a crisis in
progress, the need to create a crisis management decision making unit to focus on Berlin was
still not perceived, nor was the President advised to consider such an action. Meanwhile, the
question that Thompson had wanted to have posed to Chancellor Adenauer regarding
suggested actions in the event of border closure never came up. Then the distraction of the
Bay of Pigs invasion set in.
As the President and others in the inner circle were temporarily pulled away from the
Berlin problem, discussion continued. On 15 April, as the Bay of Pigs invasion was getting
underway. Secretary Rusk, Martin Hillenbrand and German Ambassador Grewe met in
Rusk's office to discuss Berlin contingency planning. Among the details, Secretary Rusk





made a few very telling remarks. Said Rusk,
The governments involved should consider these matters at the highest policy
level, not just at the planning level, as if plans had nothing to do with policy.
Although all decisions could not be made in advance, there must be agreement
on the policies which should govern. In an actual crisis, governments could
not start from the beginning with their discussion of policies and plans. There
is now a gap between our plans and our policies. 16 '
Rusk expressed concern over the lack of discussions among the four powers (U.S., Britain,
France and Germany). He expressed to Ambassador Grewe that, "As the new American
Administration comes in... some of the nuances of the past may not be present and the
approach may at first seem a little over-simplified." 162
Considering the seriousness of the situation, Rusks remarks are concerning. The
Administration did not cultivate strong professional relationships with the IC or career
Department of State personnel (other than Acheson — merely a consultant) who could have
imparted the required current institutional knowledge to deal effectively with the crisis. With
this in mind, Rusk appeared curiously nonchalant. He did not seem to feel any responsibility
for the gap between plans and policy even though he recognized its existence. He should
have considered himself the bridge across that gap. He should have used State Department
resources to support the President more aggressively. Now his captain was unknowingly
taking the ship of state into an enemy minefield. From the beginning, Kennedy had spent
three and a half months in a reactionary mode on Berlin and was now on the brink of being
dealt a huge setback in Cuba.





THE BA Y OF PIGS INVASION
Analyzing the failure at the Bay of Pigs could fill volumes. However, what we are
interested in is how the presidential decision making process with regard to Berlin was
affected by this event. Hence, the following discussion is necessarily brief.
With the President's attention completely focused on Cuba, two things occurred.
First, his focus shifted from Berlin for several days. Second, the way in which he worked
with his advisors during the Bay of Pigs situation revealed much about the presidential
decision making process in general, and the effectiveness of the IC in particular.
Recall that Kennedy had basically accepted the invasion planning process and
timetable from the Eisenhower Administration during the early transition period. As the date
of the operation drew near however, he began to become anxious. About a week before the
invasion, the President telephoned his brother and said that he was going to send someone
from CIA over to brief him on the upcoming operation. Bobby Kennedy received this brief
that same afternoon from Dick Bissel, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans. Said Bobby
Kennedy,
[Bissel] told me about the fact that they were thinking of an invasion - or they
were planning an invasion — and the invasion was scheduled to take place the
following week. He outlined it to me and thought that there was a great
chance of success and that they should go ahead with it. He was enthusiastic
about it. He said — this was a very important factor in my mind and I think,
in the President's ~ he said it really can't be a failure, because once they land
on the beach, even if as a military force they don't win, they can always stay
in Cuba and be guerrillas. They'll cause Castro so much difficulty. It'll be a
very important factor in bringing about his downfall. [Bissell] said this was
guerrilla territory and that they'd all been trained for guerrilla action. This
was a natural place to have a landing. Obviously, there was a chance they'd
be overcome by the military forces of Castro; but even if that happened as a
military action, they could easily become guerrillas and fight in that area and
also take to the mountains. These I men] were very well trained, and that
would be a very important factor. 163
163 Guthman and Shulman, 240.
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The fact that the President brought his brother into the equation demonstrated that he
believed he needed more support with the decision making process — support he was not
getting from the CIA. His lack of confidence in the way that the operation was progressing
was also revealed by the fact that he sent a special emissary to Guatemala where the guerilla
force was training with the CIA. A U.S. Marine Colonel, highly decorated in World War II,
the emissary was personally briefed by the President on what to look for. Upon his return,
the Colonel wrote a memorandum and gave a briefing claiming that he, "had never seen such
an effective military force, that they had the fighting power, the techniques, and the
skills."
164 He recommended very forcefully that they should go ahead with the landing,
and his efforts were most instrumental in convincing the President to proceed. Bobby
Kennedy supported the invasion, as did Allen Dulles, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others.
The invasion was of course a complete failure for numerous reasons, among them:
communications problems, incorrect intelligence regarding the terrain, lack of strong
leadership from the top of the CIA, and insubordination on the part of CIA operatives.
Although many of the problems were beyond the President's direct control, as suggested
earlier, addressing those problems occupied the Administration with internal reorganization
until the Vienna summit in June drew near. Unfortunately, the reorganization distracted the
Administration from focusing on the Berlin Crisis. This distraction, coupled with the already
weak condition of the President's "team," led to poor preparation for Vienna. The ship of




FROM THE BAY OF PIGS TO VIENNA
Immediately after the invasion, there was a lot of second guessing and concerns within
the Administration about who was loyal to the President during the crisis and what should
have been done. Of course the finger pointed primarily at the CIA. Maxwell Taylor was
brought in and set up his investigation panel. Members of the Taylor panel included Allen
Dulles, Attorney General Kennedy, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A.
Burke. The members disagreed as to whether or not the invasion plans had had any chance
of success. 165 Of great significance, there had been tremendous communications delays
during the invasion which had made it gutwrenchingly impossible for the Administration to
know what was going on so as to react to redirect the outcome. This frustration was revealed
when twelve-hours-old reports relayed that things were not going well. Recall Eleanor
Lansing Dulles' quote at the end of Chapter 3.
As with the CIA, Kennedy also was frustrated with his military advisors during the
Bay of Pigs debacle. He was already of the mindset that the military needed restructuring,
and in this regard, McNamara was his point man. Kennedy's frustrations framed his
relations with his military advisors during the Berlin Crisis, increasing his reliance on
Maxwell Taylor. In an interview with John Bartlow Martin, in March 1964, Bobby Kennedy
related this sentiment:
The President had been used to dealing with people and having them know
what they were talking about. He came into government as the successor to
President Eisenhower, who was a great general, a great military figure... He
retained the same people in all these key positions whom President Eisenhower
had. Allen Dulles was there, Lemnitzer [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff] was there, the same Joint Chiefs of Staff. He didn't attempt to move
any of those people out. And these were the people who were around this
table when they were making the decisions. It was on their recommendations
and suggestions and their intelligence information — what they found the
163 Facts On File, 135.
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situation to be on their homework -- that he based his decision.
Now, he took the responsibility, which was the right thing to do. But it
was based on people he had confidence in, not because he had known them
himself but just because they had been there. They had had the experience;
they had had the background; they were evidently trusted by his predecessor.
So he thought that he could trust them.
...Well, what ultimately came out of this was that he never substituted
anybody else's judgement for his own. The second thing is that, whenever a
problem or question came up, he went into the facts minutely. 166
As a result of Kennedy's growing distrust of the bureaucracy, he would actually cause it to
grow. His intention was to broaden the decision making base in hopes of improving the
quality of decisions. Unfortunately, these actions would serve only to muddle the process,
making it more and more inefficient, especially when it came to crisis decision making.
On 23 April, as the Taylor panel was just in its inception, the Berlin Crisis was
continuing, unaffected by events in Cuba. Khrushchev told the Federal Republic of
Germany's Ambassador to the Soviet Union that he would sign a treaty with the GDR but not
until after the West German elections in September or perhaps after the Congress of the
CPSU in October. 167 Two days later, McGeorge Bundy signed a National Security Council
Memorandum which recommended that the U.S. make it a matter of highest priority to
increase manning, modernization of equipment, and improving mobility of NATO non-
nuclear forces in Europe. Further that the U.S. "should urge rapid progress toward building
up a mobile task force to deal with threats to the NATO flanks." 168 It would take more
than three months before Bundy's memo would have any effect.
Although many changes were implemented as a result of the Bay of Pigs invasion, it
is significant that Hillenbrand believes that - other than Oleg Pentkovskiy's contribution — as
166 Guthman and Shulman, 246-247.
167 Charles S. Sampson, "Editorial Note," Foreign Relations of the United States, 55.
168 McGeorge Bundy, "National Security Memorandum Number 40," 24 April 1961, The
Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 [microform].
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a whole, the CIA played a rather small role in the Berlin Crisis. 169 Recall from Chapter 7
that Allen Dulles had "lost touch" with CIA operations.
In National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) number 11-7-61, dated 25 April 1961, and
entitled, "Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany," the CIA set out to
"estimate probable Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany over the next six
months or so." The NIE made bold assertions about Khrushchev's intentions, claiming that,
"Almost certainly, Khrushchev still prefers to negotiate on this matter rather than to provoke
a crisis by unilateral action, chiefly because he desires to avoid the risks of a showdown in
this dangerous area of East-West confrontation."
The estimate claimed that the Soviets, "will concentrate on getting an 'interim
agreement,' of the kind outlined at Geneva in 1959, which would constitute a first step
toward eliminating Allied occupation rights in West Berlin." The estimate stated that if
negotiations did not happen, or if they broke down, that the Soviets would eventually sign its
long-threatened separate peace treaty with the GDR. Further, it stated that, "the U.S.S.R. is
likely to continue to offer negotiations, always hopeful that the allies can be induced to
accede peacefully to the eventual loss of the Western position in Berlin." The NIE clearly
stated that the Soviet's goal was absorption of West Berlin but that it would seek to achieve
this goal in stages. It is noteworthy that, as we see later, this estimate spelled out nearly
exactly what Khrushchev would put forward in his conversation with Kennedy at the June
Vienna summit which would surprise and discourage the President! Once again, good
analysis was lost in the bureaucratic shuffle.
It is also noteworthy that the NIE indicated that the Soviets wanted to negotiate, as did
many in the U.S., but Dean Acheson's advice was taking its toll. Hillenbrand asserts that
169
Hillenbrand, telephone interview, 14 March 1997.
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there were, in actuality, three positions on negotiating that emerged: 1) do not negotiate as it
will weaken the NATO alliance (Acheson); 2) negotiate openly to diffuse the crisis and do
not be concerned about Soviet long-term intentions with regard to West Berlin (elements of
the White House Staff); and 3) negotiate as a holding operation to diffuse the crisis but do
not permit a situation to occur from which the Soviets might achieve future gains
(Hillenbrand). 170
Meanwhile, in the beginning of May, despite the recent failed Cuba invasion, the
atmosphere in Berlin proper appeared surprisingly content with the status quo. As the New
York Times wrote on 6 May 1961,
West Berlin's spring mood derives from a number of things besides the
season itself. One is the post-war prosperity that has wiped out unemployment
and, in fact, has created a labor shortage. Another is the seemingly unshakable
faith in the Allies' guarantee of the city's freedom, renewed recentiy during
Mayor Will Brandt's and Chancellor Adenauer's visits to Washington.
A third is simply that the West Berliners have lived so long with the
Soviet threat that they have come to accept it as part of their way of life.
Had the Administration been bitten by this same complacency bug?
With the Vienna summit approaching, the analysis began to be generated more
rapidly. Once the various inputs were combined, the intensity of the crisis was once again
revealed in stark relief. In a memorandum to the President with a cover letter dated 5 May
1961, Henry Kissinger wrote, in what he called his "preliminary reflections on Berlin" that,
"the fate of Berlin is the touchstone for the future of the North Atlantic Community...The
realization of the Communist proposal that Berlin become a 'free city' could well be the
decisive turn in the struggle of freedom against tyranny." Further, Kissinger wrote using
intrepid language that,
Hillenbrand, telephone interview, 14 March 1997.
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Berlin's freedom can be maintained only if the Soviets are willing to be
satisfied with essentially face-saving concessions. If the Soviets maintain their
present position, the major goal of our policy will have to be to make Soviet
unilateral action seem extremely risky. In other words, we must be prepared
to face a showdown. 171
Of Khrushchev's intentions, Kissinger went on to say that,
Soviet motivations are essentially irrelevant to our policies. It is not
necessary to choose in the abstract between the school of thought that claims
that the issue of Berlin is primarily a device to force us into negotiations, or
that which sees in it a Soviet device to stabilize its hold on Eastern Germany.
Our proposals should depend not on Soviet purposes but on our own. Soviet
intentions are relevant to the negotiability of certain proposals and not to their
merits. The limits of the negotiable are set basically by the requirements of
Berlin's freedom...
Two distinct dangers to the freedom of Berlin exist: (a) A threat to the
supply lines of the Allied garrison now controlled by Soviet personnel; (b) An
interruption of the civilian traffic turned over to East Germany in 1955
following the Geneva summit meeting and since then regulated by technical
negotiations between the Federal Republic and the GDR...
United States policy with respect to the peace treaty should be that this
measure is a way of precipitating a crisis, not a document creating a new legal
situation...The cause of a showdown should be the fact of interruption or
harassment to Berlin, not the signing of a peace treaty.
The United States should not undertake any military step without a prior
decision on whether we are prepared to employ nuclear weapons and if so,
how. Western contingency planning has been almost completely deficient in
this respect.
m
Kissinger's analysis, if taken seriously, should have triggered some very solemn
questions. First, he declared that we should prepare for a showdown. Would not
preparations for a showdown indicate that the U.S. was already in a crisis? Second, he
declared that we should not make military preparations without planning for nuclear war.
Would not those plans, soberly initiated, indicate that the U.S. was already in a crisis?
Would not the "interruption or harassment" to Berlin simply signal an increase in the intensity
171 Memorandum, Henry Kissinger to President Kennedy, 5 May 1961, "Germany-Berlin




of an already-existing crisis? Although this might appear to be a matter of semantics,
Kissinger's attitude reflected the principle of "cognitive consistency" discussed in Chapter 5.
That attitude was that a state of crisis did not yet exist, that it was something still on the
horizon.
The same day as the Kissinger memorandum, the White House also received the
response that McGeorge Bundy's memo of 25 April had requested from Secretary of Defense
McNamara. President Kennedy had requested a "prompt report on the current military
planning for a possible crisis over Berlin." The McNamara memo detailed a Joint Chiefs of
Staff review of Berlin contingency planning with specific attention paid to the Acheson memo
(3 April 1961) and its discussion of the use of force:
Although, as the Joint Chiefs report, the unilateral military planning
"within existing capabilities and national policy guidance" is satisfactory, the
national policy guidance is not. NSC 5803, dated February 7, 1958, on which
Berlin Contingency Planning is based, does not reflect new developments in
U.S. strategic thinking. Specifically, NSC 5803 implies the U.S. "will be
prepared to go immediately to general war after using only limited military
force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin." This is inconsistent with current
thinking which proposes the use of substantial conventional force before
considering resort to nuclear weapons and other general war measures. An
early restatement of our national policy with regard to Berlin Contingency
Planning is desirable...
...we should not overlook the likelihood of an uprising in East Germany
and other satellite countries should a sizable and active allied military
movement in East Germany take place. There is a need for an immediate
assessment of our capability to use and support special forces and guerrilla-type
operations and to coordinate them properly with normal military action.
In summary, I believe that:
a. The Chiefs' studies will help resolve three of the questions raised by Mr.
Acheson in his memorandum.
b. We must urgently re-examine the national policy guidance on which our
unilateral U.S. planning is based, and translate this U.S. policy guidance into
agreed tripartite policy.
c. We must arrange for participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in
Berlin Contingency Planning.
d. The full potential for U.S. and non-U. S. "special operations" should be
developed and coordinated with our planned military actions.
We shall initiate recommendations to the NSC to permit the accomplishment of
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items b, c, and d. 173
So, after only a few weeks, punctuated by the Bay of Pigs invasion, several key
assumptions were pieced together by the Administration: 1) Negotiations could be harmful to
the NATO alliance (Acheson); 2) At best, negotiations were limited by Berlin's freedom
(Kissinger); 3) The U.S.S.R. eventually intended to take West Berlin from the allies (CIA);
4) The taking of West Berlin could cause the Western alliance to collapse and the U.S.
needed to be prepared to face a showdown to dissuade the Soviets from attempting a takeover
(Kissinger); 5) Before any military action, the U.S. had to decide if it was prepared to use
nuclear weapons (Kissinger); and, 6) The U.S. would have only the military option of using
nuclear weapons if it did not undertake a substantial conventional forces buildup which would
require a change to its current policy (McNamara, et. al.)
After assimilating these assumptions, President Kennedy began to recognize the need
for decisive, comprehensive action on a large scale and he began to turn his efforts toward
preparing for the Vienna summit. On that same day (5 May 1961), President Kennedy
drafted a letter to President de Gaulle discussing arrangements for the summit.
It is interesting that one of the steps taken by Dean Rusk at the State Department as a
reaction to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was to establish a special "crisis center." Known as the
Special Operations Center, it was designed to help the Secretary of State and the President
get information and recommendations quickly in the face of fast-breaking world
developments. The facility was configured for twenty-four hour operation and was located
next to Department headquarters on the seventh floor of the State Department building, only
a minute's walk from the Secretary's office. There were bunks for those on night alert. The
'"Memorandum, Robert McNamara to President Kennedy, 5 May 1961, "Germany-
Berlin General Report By The Joint Chiefs of Staff Part I 5/5/61" folder, National Security
Files, box 81, JFKL.
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center was staffed with six Foreign Service Officers divided up into two teams. Interestingly
enough, one group was working on South Vietnam, the other, Cuba. There was initially no
Berlin group. The Center was expected to draw on special duty personnel from CIA and the
Department of Defense. It was not expected to have a large permanent staff. The Center
was supposed to have three primary tasks: 1) To pull together, as soon as possible, all
available data - surveys, position papers, current intelligence reports and the like — on the
problem at hand; 2) To press for the earliest possible recommendations on policy to deal with
:he crisis to the Secretary of State and the President; and, 3) To follow up on decisions to see
Jiat they were carried out quickly and efficiently.
The Center was to take the place of the Operations Coordination Board previously
responsible for insuring that decisions of the National Security Council were carried out. 174
\t face value, the Center seemed like a good idea, but its benefit was never realized in the
;ase of Berlin, although it was eventually activated on Berlin's behalf.
As the Kennedy Administration began to shift its focus to the Vienna summit, the
NATO Council of Ministers was concluding its conference in Oslo, Norway. At the
Deginning of the conference, Berlin had not been the top item on the agenda, but as the
inference drew to a close on 8 May, the international community as a whole began to view
the situation in Berlin as one of "crisis" dimensions once again. Secretary of State Rusk
made the statement that should, "the Soviet Union proceed to sign a peace treaty [with the
GDR], the Allies would insist on continued Western rights of access to West Berlin. They
would make it clear. . .that this unilateral act by the Russians could not affect Western rights
in Berlin, which the Allied powers are determined to continue to exercise." 175 It was at
Oslo that the Western allies began to publicly discuss their intentions to improve conventional
174New York Times, 7 May 1961.
175New York Times, 9 May 1961.
95
forces so that atomic weapons would be used only as a last resort. Dean Rusk strongly
asserted that the West would not tolerate further setbacks in Berlin.
Meanwhile, Chancellor Adenauer's government in Bonn had drafted a formal rejection
of the Soviet proposal for talks with them about a German peace treaty. The Soviet
memorandum, which had actually been delivered back on 17 February, was a "mixture of
blandishments and threats, all posed with a minimum of the usual diplomatic subtleties." 176
Chancellor Adenauer's draft reply was being considered by the governments of the U.S.,
Britain and France. The big question, once again, was whether or not to negotiate with the
Soviets.
The West German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Dr. Hans Kroll, having recently
returned from his 23 April visit with Khrushchev, was just beginning to spread "the
conviction that the renewed crisis over Berlin would not be set off until after the mid-
September elections in West Germany and perhaps not until after the Soviet Communist Party
Congress in October." 177 The ambiguity of the existence of a crisis continued.
On 10 May, Henry Kissinger -- referred to by the New York Times as "an adviser to
President Kennedy on military strategy" — conferred with Bonn's Defense Minister Franz
Josef Strauss. Said the Times,
The West Germans have a great deal to discuss with Dr. Kissinger. They
credit him with inspiring what they believe to be a new emerging United States
defense concept based on the possibility of limited war against Communist
aggression.
As the West Germans see it, Washington's emphasis on the build-up of
conventional weapons is part of this concept.
"It would give me holy terrors," Herr Strauss said during a recent
Parliamentary debate on the defense budget, "If I were to hear that a
conventional attack was to be met only with conventional weapons.
West German leaders have permitted and even encouraged the




conviction that atomic retaliation would meet any Communist incursion, small
or big. 178
On 1 1 May, the CIA's "Current Intelligence Weekly Summary" stated that,
"Khrushchev has committed himself to a solution during 1961." On the same day, in East
Berlin, the Soviet military commander was replaced, giving rise to some suspicions that
preparations were being made for turnover to the East Germans. The West, in the NATO
communique published at the end of the Oslo meeting, "reaffirmed their conviction that a
peaceful and just solution for the problem of Germany, including Berlin, is to be found only
on the basis of self-determination." 179 The problem with this lofty but unrealistic
conviction was that if Germany would have taken action based on its desire for self-
determination, the result would not have been peaceful.
On 16 May, the President received a letter from Khrushchev, dated 12 May, which
expressed his desire that Vienna would be "a general exchange of views." The next day, in a
note to McGeorge Bundy from Henry Owen of the National Security Council, Owen wrote
that, "The importance of the stakes and the direct confrontation of U.S. and Soviet forces
make [Berlin] a more likely casus belli than anything else on the horizon." 180
It was about at this point that the press came alive with discussion of the upcoming
summit. The Department of State began generating issue papers for the President with
"talking points" on a number of different issues. On 20 May, de Gaulle flew to Bonn for
talks with Adenauer intended to unify the allied position on several topics. The President and
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the Chancellor were reported to have reached "particularly complete agreement" on
Berlin. 181 Adenauer expressed complete confidence in Kennedy, saying that, "he
considered Germany's interests to be 'in good hands'." 182 Soviet officials in Geneva
expressed their desire to "remove misunderstandings" in Vienna, and they repeated their
argument for the principle of neutrality with a new slogan: "No export of revolution by
Moscow, but no export of counter-revolution by Washington either." 183
In a "Scope Paper" prepared for the President by the Department of State (author
unknown), the U.S. objectives of the summit were spelled out:
A. To improve the prospects of finding an acceptable and workable basis for
improving relations with the Soviet Union.
B. To impress on Khrushchev our capacity and resolve to resist Soviet and
Communist encroachments if he is unwilling to seek a satisfactory basis for
better relations and to stress the dangers attendant on continued, sharp
confrontations between the two countries.
C. To communicate to Khrushchev the President's understanding and grasp of
the world situation, in an historical as well as immediate sense, and his
capacity and intent to influence the course of world events.
D. To gain a clearer understanding of Khrushchev as a man and of Soviet
policy and intentions. 184
The paper went on to describe the goals Khrushchev would probably seek and some tactics
that might have been useful for the President to pursue. It stated that Khrushchev, "will
undoubtedly press hard his position on Berlin and a peace treaty with East Germany and will
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try to get some form of commitment to negotiate the Berlin question." 185 Significant is the
point that the decision as to whether or not the U.S. would actually negotiate was not made.
Another "Talking Points" paper (author unknown) dated that same day stated that,
"Aspects of the situation in Berlin and Germany are unsatisfactory to the Western powers as
well as to the Soviet Union but nothing is intolerable to either; the security interests of the
Soviet Union are not threatened." This paper went on to say, "The wisest course is to leave
the situation alone until arms reduction makes solutions easier." 186
The point papers completely missed several critical details. Among these were the
Soviets' strong dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the security threat posed to the Soviet
Union by the refugee flow in Berlin. They simply overlooked this altogether. All of the
previous advice from Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Grewe, and others fell by the
wayside. Also, they did not prepare the President to respond to any Soviet ultimatums. And
finally, these papers did not make it into the hands of the President until 26 May, giving him
very little time to digest them and ask questions prior to travelling.
On the evening of 23 May in Moscow, Ambassador Thompson had dinner with
Khrushchev, at the latter' s insistence. Khrushchev reiterated the point that he had made with
Kroll that if no agreement was reached on Berlin, the U.S.S.R. would sign a separate peace
treaty in the fall or winter after German elections and probably after the party congress. He
was convinced that this would not lead to war, and that German reunification was impossible,
that in fact no one really wanted it, including de Gaulle, MacMillan and Adenauer. On the
subject of the refugee "problem," Khrushchev told Thompson that "Berlin was a running sore
185
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which had to be eliminated." 187 On the subject of access, Khrushchev, "repeated
categorically [that J our access would be prevented. He said they would not touch our troops
in Berlin but [thatj they might have to tighten their belts. He said however they would not
impose [a] blockade." 188
Perhaps the most revealing remark made by Khrushchev was to the effect that
although the U.S. might be satisfied with the status quo, the U.S.S.R. was not and that if it
did not change by fall or winter of that year, Soviet prestige would be damaged. 189
In another telegram, sent later the same day, from Thompson to Secretary Rusk, the
Ambassador dispensed with concerns that there might be any internal leadership struggles
within the Soviet Union. Thompson related that Khrushchev's colleagues may attempt to
unseat him if they felt Khrushchev was taking actions which might lead to war. Thompson
believed that the U.S.S.R. had successfully manipulated world opinion to create the
impression that the West was saying no to a proposal that would avoid war. He went on to
discuss the need to negotiate until the West could agree on "some positive position." He
closed by stating that he strongly believed that a separate peace treaty would lead to a "really
major crisis."
In a telegram to Secretary Rusk the next day, 25 May, the U.S. Mission Director in
Berlin, Allan Lightner, stated that the, "Sov[iets] could live with [the] Berlin status quo for
some time." Further, Lightner went on to say, "In sum, Vienna will be [a] psychological
testing ground and [the] U.S position on Berlin in my view should be molded carefully to
create [the] strongest possible impression on Khrushchev of U.S. firmness of intention on







Berlin in [an] effort to deter him further from [the] course of action he has been threatening
since November 1958. "m Who to believe, Thompson (Khrushchev) or Lightner?
The next day, Senator Mike Mansfield sent a memorandum to President Kennedy with
the subject line, "Observations on the Forthcoming Talks in Vienna." In it he said that, "our
record in foreign relations since January, in my opinion, leaves much to be desired...the
bureaucracy is still little improved over the Eisenhower days." 191 Mansfield expressed
concern that the talks might degenerate into a verbal slug-fest, saying,
I am disturbed by the reports which have reached me that Thompson says
Khrushchev intends to take a very hard and tough line at Vienna. If these
reports are reliable, I recommend strongly that you convey to Khrushchev at
once, in an appropriate fashion, the idea that you are going to Vienna for
serious, sober, frank but quiet preliminary discussions of the problems of
peace, without a chip on you shoulder. Further. I would let him know in
polite but unmistakable fashion that unless he is of a similar mind it is not too
late to cancel the meeting until a more appropriate time . 192
Obviously, the President chose to disregard the Senator's advice.
McGeorge Bundy put together a bundle of reading material for Kennedy on 26 May
so that the President could begin preparation in earnest. It included memoranda of
conversation, conference information, all Thompson's dispatches, CIA analysis of
Khrushchev's character and style, and the talking papers on Paris and Vienna which Bundy
had just received that day (!). So, although much of the above analysis and advice was
generated over time, Kennedy got much of it late, and all at one time.
On 27 May, Thompson sent another telegram expressing concern about the
190 Telegram, Ambassador Lightner to Secretary Rusk, 25 May 1961, The Berlin Crisis
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recommendations some of his colleagues were making to the President. He stated that he
believed Khrushchev had so deeply committed his personal prestige and that of the U.S.S.R.
to some action on the Berlin and German problems, that if the U.S. were to take a
completely negative stand, as suggested by his colleagues in Germany, "this would probably
lead to developments in which chances of war or ignominious Western retreat are close to SO-
SO."
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On 29 May, Bundy gave the President a memorandum answering questions about
various nuances among the bundle of advice which was given him on the 26th. He also
attached a paper written by Hillenbrand, informing Kennedy that Hillenbrand would be in
Vienna and that he was "an able man." Two days later, Kennedy touched down in Paris for
talks with de Gaulle before continuing on to Vienna to meet with Khrushchev.
In concluding this section, it should become apparent that there was an almost frantic
sense of eleventh hour analysis leading up to Vienna. Others throughout the government
realized rather late that the summit was extremely important and appeared to make a "last
ditch effort" to get the President up to speed. The archives show in excruciating detail that
the Administration was "behind the power curve." Kennedy, as mentioned earlier, was not
managing the situation as a crisis (i.e., involving the significant risk of war), but merely as a
foreign policy problem. The decision making process was not streamlined, the State
Department's Special Operations Center was not doing what it was supposed to do, and as the
President made every effort to get up to speed, the Soviet Union kept its firm grasp on the
initiative. The question of what to do in the event that the Soviets secured the east-west
border in Berlin had become lost in a sea of seemingly more important yet unanswered
questions.




The visit with de Gaulle was positive and Kennedy pressed on to Vienna. After lunch
on the second day of the two-day summit (3-4 June), Kennedy held a private conversation
with Khrushchev. The conversation was brief and the tone rapidly decayed from less than
cordial to counterproductive. Kennedy initiated the exchange aggressively. Khrushchev
expressed concern that the U.S. was attempting to humiliate the Soviet Union, but that he
would be glad if the U.S. were to agree to an interim arrangement with some time limit so
that the prestige and interests of the two countries would not be involved or prejudiced.
Khrushchev blamed the U.S. for increasing the prospects of war between the two countries
claiming the decision to sign a peace treaty was firm and irrevocable and that the Soviet
Union would sign it in December if the U.S. refused the interim agreement. The interim
agreement which Khrushchev envisioned would have threatened U.S. access but Khrushchev
maintained that borders would not be affected and that if the U.S. wanted war, that was its
problem. President Kennedy rather unimpressively concluded the conversation by observing
that it would be a cold winter. 194
FROM VIENNA TO THE WALL
"The Bay of Pigs disaster and Khrushchev's assertive behavior at their summit
meeting in Vienna exacerbated Kennedy's concern that Khrushchev regarded him as weak and
irresolute and that this could lead the Soviet leader to miscalculate and take actions that could
lead to war." 195 As mentioned earlier, the President took significant action as a result of
Vienna, building a large analysis and decision making machine which included many people,
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from academics, to government officials, to diplomats. From a crisis management standpoint
however, his actions did not make the decision making process more efficient. In fact, quite
the contrary was true. Wrote Grimm, "I suspect that a real crisis decision-making forum
would have drastically reduced the number of actors which would thereby increase efficiency
and camouflage the drama." 196
On 7 June, Kennedy met with Congressional leadership to brief them on the summit.
He stated that he believed Khrushchev would probably sign a peace treaty, and that if he did,
the U.S. would simply not accept it. The Soviets had given the Kennedy team an aide
memoire which Kennedy subsequently passed on to the State Department so that they could
draft a response. The administrative process of drafting this response created more pressure
between the State Department and the White House staff as it was apparently significantly
delayed by bureaucratic negligence. According to Hillenbrand, the draft response was
forwarded to the White House for approval in a timely manner but was subsequently locked
in a safe by a staff member who then went on vacation for two weeks! The second draft
which was then sent over was misplaced. 197 Arthur Schlesinger blamed the State
Department for the delay and further referred to the draft, once it eventually was received,
as, "a tired and turgid rehash of documents left over from the Berlin crisis of 1958-59." 198
On 13 June, the first of a series of SNIEs was released describing "Soviet and Other
Reactions to Various Courses of Action Regarding Berlin." It discussed four possible courses
of action in the event of an unacceptable degree of Soviet or East German interference with
Western access to West Berlin: "(a) a substantial effort to maintain ground access to West
Berlin by a limited military action; (b) a substantial effort to maintain air access; (c) other
196 Grimm, 17.




pressures and reprisals against the USSR and East Germany; and (d) large-scale preparations
for general war." 199
There was a furious search for creative solutions to the crisis which resulted in
memoranda from wide and varied individuals. Walt Rostow's brother, Gene, Dean of Yale
Law School contributed. Ambassador Thompson, unsurprisingly, provided fresh analysis
which included the statement that, if no solution was reached during a period after entry into
force of a separate treaty and interference with allied access, "we should then proceed with
military action, including the use of tactical atomic weapons." 200 Wrote Walt Rostow,
Essentially, Khrushchev's strategy comes to this: he exerts pressure at some
point on our side of the line; by such pressure he creates a situation in which
we can only reply at the risk of starting a nuclear war or escalating in that
direction; faced with this prospect, we look for compromise; he backs down a
little; and a compromise is struck which, on balance, moves his line forward,
and shifts us back. . . we must be prepared to increase the risk of war on his
side of the line as well as facing it on ours. 201
On 28 June, a thirty-one page paper was submitted by Dean Acheson. At its crux: concern
that the Kennedy Administration should make early decisions about when and under what
circumstances to resort to the use of force.
On 29 June, Kennedy called a meeting of the National Security Council to consider a
report prepared by the Department of State. The report recommended a vigorous response to
any challenge to allied access, to include military measures. Kennedy wanted more
information and ordered a joint study between State and Defense. Dean Acheson was
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requested to pursue negotiations (!). The State-Defense group was led by Foy Kohler and
became known as the Berlin Task Force. It met on a daily basis (one hour or more) in the
White House for the next few months. The Special Operations Center at the State
Department now turned its focus on Berlin.
According to Grimm, there was some discord within the Task Force at the White
House over differences in policy, but also on a more personal and emotional level because,
"many of the people involved in State and Defense were getting acquainted under intense
pressure."
202
This corresponds to what we know about the "team." The Berlin Task Force
was responsible to a Steering Committee chaired by Secretary Rusk. Other members of the
Steering Committee were the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Director of the CIA, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the Chairman of the JCS,
Maxwell Taylor and McGeorge Bundy. Said Bobby Kennedy, "we set up the Steering
Committee to be a smaller group that was to do what the [National] Security Council was
supposed to have done when it was originally formed." 203 In addition to these groups,
there was also an Ambassadorial Group which met every afternoon.
As the summer progressed, it became clear that the management of the situation was
an American show. Adenauer and de Gaulle were not interested in negotiations. MacMillan
went along with Kennedy.
Meanwhile, the analysis continued to flow into the White House. Roger Hilsman,
from the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research produced input. Henry
Owen suggested having President Eisenhower get involved as a means of neutralizing partisan
attacks on the Administration's foreign policy decisions (when they eventually made some.)
Owen was later brought onto the White House staff. Military mobilization plans began to be
202 Grimm, 17.
203Guthman and Shulman, 272.
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considered in earnest. Henry Kissinger wrote Bundy urging that the U.S. should now define
its nuclear options and that he feared the military might try to force the hand of the President
during a crisis. He recommended that the Defense Department be asked to "submit a plan
for graduated nuclear response even if the Joint Chiefs do not consider it the optimum
strategy."
204
As an aside, in discussions which occurred while the President was in Hyannis Port on
8 July, the President tasked Maxwell Taylor with arranging "an early meeting of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee [which would occur on 18 July 1961] to
obtain a new recommendation on the reorganization of the CIA assuming that new legislation
is to be sought." 205 The aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion was still on the radar scope.
That same day (8 July), referring to earlier increases in U.S. defense appropriations,
Khrushchev announced a thirty-four percent increase in Soviet military expenditure, reversing
policy of the previous year. 206 On 10 July, McNamara announced an urgent review of
U.S. military strength to develop actual cost estimates of a conventional forces buildup. The
mental transition from "problem" to "crisis" had begun, and it quickly spread from the
government, to the press.
On 11 July, SNIE 2-2-61 was released within the government. Its purpose was to
provide an estimate of,
the probable reactions of the U.S.S.R., Communist China, the NATO
members, and certain other countries to a set of measures reflecting U.S.
determination to preserve the Western position in Berlin. These measures
include military, political, economic, and clandestine preparations designed
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both to convey US intentions to undertake steps up to and including, if
necessary, general war, and to put the US in a position to carry out these
steps.
Regarding the Soviet leaders attitude toward war, the SNIE stated that, "We continue to
believe that, so long as they remain vulnerable to U.S. strategic power, they will not
willingly enter into situations in which, by their calculations, the risks of general war are
substantial." The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, added
his personal conclusion as a footnote to this statement: "...and will endeavor to draw back
from such situations should they evolve."
The next day, former President Eisenhower stated that the United States must stand
firmly in Berlin and "not let anybody scare us out." 207 The former President described the
situation as "explosive" and also declared that Americans should be united behind the
President on foreign aid and defense.
At the President's direction, the Berlin Task Force began preparing "a combined
check list of possible actions relating to Berlin which should be considered for
implementation in the present and emerging situation... [which would] show for each action
the lead time of decision." 208 Meanwhile, within NATO, representatives from the U.S.,
Britain and France drafted parallel notes condemning the proposed Soviet peace treaty as a
step being "taken without the consent of the German people," and "in total disregard of the
rights of the people of West Berlin." 209 The U.S. version of the note, delivered to the
Soviets on 17 July, was described by the New York Times as "firm without being
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bellicose." 2 '
Senator Hubert Humphrey stated that the Communist bloc was grappling with
staggering food shortages and that this might be behind the Soviet Union's pressure on West
Berlin. He described Khrushchev's drive on Berlin, as "part of an effort to cover up the
massive food problem in his wobbly empire." 211
The next day, the Defense Minister Strauss of West Germany met with Robert
McNamara at the Pentagon. Strauss negotiated the purchase of 165 million dollars worth of
military equipment, including Pershing missiles and F- 104 jet fighters. Strauss would say at
a press conference on 1 August, that he believed the U.S.S.R. might risk "city guerilla
warfare" in Berlin. 212
In an unsigned memorandum entitled "Berlin Decisions" (presumably drafted by
Kohler and the Berlin Task Force), "immediate" and "more long-range" decisions were
outlined. The memorandum stated that these decisions needed to be made, "very soon as a
basis for early allied consultations." 213 It listed the following as immediate decisions:
1. Military . The rate and timing of immediate mibtary preparations.
2. Economic . The proposals regarding sanctions that we will now make to our allies and the
tactic of our approach.
3. Political . Our allies will want early decisions on two points:
(a) What should be our posture toward negotiations in the early stages of the crisis?
(b) What should be our posture toward East German personnel along the access
routes after a treaty?
That day (17 July), Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, the Secretary of the Treasury, Bobby
Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, Ted Sorensen and McGeorge Bundy met at the White House.
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The cost of the military force buildup for Berlin was discussed. A price tag of about 4.5
billion dollars was expected. This would include Civil Defense, three STRAF divisions, the
possible provision of 64,000 additional men to fill out U.S. NATO forces, and the ability to
accommodate large-scale troop call up under a declaration of national emergency (not
expected immediately). 214 The second major item which was discussed was the need to
develop a common negotiating position with the allies. Discussion of the U.S. position was
inconclusive. Rusk stated that self-determination should be emphasized and that, "probably
we would wish to spin out the discussion in order to make it difficult for Mr. Khrushchev to
proceed with concrete steps at an early stage." 2 ' 5
The next day, in a press conference, Kennedy stated that, "The world knows that
there is no reason for a crisis over Berlin today — and that, if one develops, it will be caused
by the Soviet Government's attempt to invade the rights of others and manufacture
tensions." 216
In a memorandum of conversation between Walt Rostow and Soviet Ambassador M.
A. Menshikov, Rostow declared that "this is our week of crucial decision on Berlin." 217
The National Security Council met two days later to deliberate the final decisions. The final
comment at the bottom of a memorandum entitled "This Afternoon's Meetings," from Bundy
to the President (which was no doubt waiting on Kennedy's desk when he arrived at the Oval
Office that day), stated simply, "This is probably the most important NSC meeting that we
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have had, and there is no reason why it cannot be continued tomorrow if you wish." 218
Following the NSC meeting, Kennedy received a few pieces of analysis from people
giving him last minute advice before he would announce his decisions to the American
public. Henry Kissinger delivered some very philosophical, political advice in a five page
memorandum entitled, "Some Rough Thoughts on the President's TV Speech." Walt
Rostow, more concisely described what he called "A High Noon Stance on Berlin." In that
memorandum, Rostow stated that, "I do believe we must be prepared in our minds for the
possibility of a relatively lonely stage; and we should accept it without throwing our sheriffs
sadge in the dust when the crisis subsides." 219
Finally, on 25 July, Kennedy announced his chosen U.S. policy in a television speech
to the nation. As summarized by Richardson, he "announced significant measures to
increase the readiness of the non-nuclear forces and their deployment in Europe, also
indicating that the response to any Soviet move might not be confined to central Europe but
would take account of Soviet vulnerabilities elsewhere." 220 Kennedy vowed to implement
increases in the regular armed forces by larger draft calls and lengthened terms of service.
Equipment would be taken out of mothballs and a civil defense program was to be
implemented. However awkward it may have been, the crisis management decision making
process had been exercised at last.
Two days passed before Khrushchev saw a translated copy of Kennedy's television
address. When he read it, his reaction was described by one Soviet official as "a fair-sized
explosion." Khrushchev went on to say, "what nonsense this all was; that war, if it came,
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would be decided by the biggest rockets and that the Soviet Union had them." 221 Later that
day, the Pentagon put about 25,000 Air National Guardsmen and 3,000 reservists on notice
as a part of the President's plan. These men would operate about 750 airplanes. A Senate
panel voted to increase defense appropriations by a billion dollars for bombers as a part of
the defense buildup. 222
On 5 to 7 August, Dean Rusk met with the allied foreign ministers in Paris to develop
a negotiating position. Due primarily to de Gaulle's unwillingness to compromise, they
failed to come up with anything tangible.
Meanwhile, 30,415 refugees were registered at West Berlin refugee centers in July as
Germans began to fear that the border would be secured. Between 1 and 13 August, upwards
of 1,500 people a day arrived in refugee centers. These figures did "not take into account
the many refugees that never bothered to check into relocation centers. Many had relatives
living comfortably in the West and were either housed in West Berlin or flown to West
Germany." 223 "Intelligence analysts advised that stringent controls on movement from East
Germany into East Berlin were more likely than a physical barrier through the city, which
they regarded as too costly to the East German government's prestige." 224 Said Kennedy in
a conversation with Walt Rostow in early August, "Khrushchev would have to do something
internally to re-establish control over the situation - and if he did, we would not be able to
do a thing about it... it was not a vital interest for the United States."225
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The construction of the Wall was approved at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact in
Moscow on 3-5 August, and the operation began on [Sunday,] 13 August, first consisting of
barbed wire barriers, followed by the beginning of the Wall a few days later."226 First
there was surprise. Local U.S. military and diplomatic officials slowly realized what was
happening and responded in a very conservative way. There was no contingency plan for
this. No U.S. officials, in the U.S. or abroad, were expecting this turn of events. Kennedy
was in Hyannis Port sailing. There was a quick jerk in Washington followed by a pregnant
pause which lasted about a week. At 11:30 a.m. EST, on 13 August, Secretary Rusk
reached President Kennedy by phone in Hyannis Port. Wrote Eleanor Lansing Dulles,
As Rusk outlined the situation, the possibilities of Western action were few.
Reports indicated that although the people were excited and even desperate; the
police seemed to have the crowds in West Berlin under control. There were
no definite signs of an uprising in the East. Advice from the field was sparse
even though by now it was late afternoon in Berlin.
After a few questions and answers which seemed to satisfy the
President, he is reported to have said, "Go to the ball game as you had
planned; I am going sailing." 227
Kennedy was content that there were no Russian soldiers in the streets of West Berlin and
that the movements of the Western allies had not been hindered. What the Administration
did not expect was the huge blow to morale of the Berliners. 228
By 18 August, the morale problem was addressed by the combination of U.S. troops
rolling down the Autobahn through East Germany to West Berlin, and the visit of Vice
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President's personal representative which, although this provided some gain in morale for the
West Berliners, diffused the chain of command in the city and frustrated the other U.S.
military and civilian officials there.
THE CRISIS SUBSIDES
On 24 August, SNIE 11-10-61, entitled "Soviet Tactics In The Berlin Crisis," was
published. This estimate specifically addressed concerns about possible developments within
East Germany. The SNIE stated that, "we conclude that the Soviets' present intention
probably is not to take further drastic action immediately, though they may undertake
measures of limited scope." It went on to say that, "we believe that their present preference
is to let the effects of the border closure sink in and see whether the Western Powers have
become more inclined to accept Soviet terms of negotiations." The estimate expressed that
major eruption in East Germany was unlikely.
On 30 August, the Soviets resumed nuclear testing but in late September, Khrushchev
initiated an important private correspondence with Kennedy which would help to reduce
tensions this might otherwise have caused. This was especially important because in October,
the Soviets would explode a fifty-megaton bomb, the largest ever recorded.
The IC went on to analyze the results of possible U.S. actions in response to a Soviet
interference with access to Berlin in additional SNIEs. SNIE 11-10/1-61, published on 5
October, exploited HUMINT from Pentkovskiy regarding Soviet military maneuvers.
Pentkovskiy believed that the Soviet leadership might be preparing for a potential "first
strike" after signing the threatened separate peace treaty later that month. The IC rejected
this HUMINT as improbable.
On 17 October, Khrushchev withdrew the 31 December deadline. Two days later,
SNIE 2-6-61 evaluated possible scenarios in which the U.S. might employ nuclear weapons
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in response to blocked access to Berlin. The SNIE concluded,
we think it important to stress that, should substantial hostilities occur over
access, this would represent either a major Soviet miscalculation or a major
change in Soviet intentions as we have hitherto conceived them. Whereas we
presently believe that the Soviets regard the Berlin crisis as within their
control, the outbreak of fighting would signify either their failure to manage
events in the way they had anticipated or their willingness to accept more
substantial risks than we had thought. To the uncertainties flowing from this
turn of events would be added the uncertainties of a totally unprecedented
situation in which the two nuclear superpowers were engaged in direct military
combat.
For the remainder of the year, there were tensions, to be sure, but nothing like the
period just before the Wall went up. From October of 1961 to May of 1962, the "crisis
reverted to a situation analogous to the early months of 1959 - a search for agreement among
the Western powers on a basis for negotiation." 229 There were strained U.S. relations with
France and West Germany. France wanted nuclear independence; Germany was disappointed
with U.S. acceptance of the status quo. The negotiations would never reach the point of the
exchange of formal proposals. But of course, war never happened.
Wrote Grimm, "the Kennedy administration kept open the doors to negotiation,
although it was too late - the Soviets had already exchanged a pawn for a knight. " 23° Said
Bobby Kennedy, "I don't think people really understood generally around the country. The
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• CHAPTER 9 *
CONCLUSIONS
In late September 1961, Walter Lippmann wrote:
The Western Powers were caught unprepared to deal with the actual, as
distinguished from the supposed, Soviet strategy, which is revealed by the
action of August 13. For instead of blockading West Berlin, Khrushchev
sealed off East Berlin.
...the preoccupation of the President's advisers with the memory of
Stalin's blockade in 1948 prevented them from preparing adequately for the
formidable measures short of war which were available to Khrushchev.
The effect of the miscalculation has been far-reaching... 232
To some degree, President Kennedy simply had to accept the situation in Berlin as it
existed when he came to office. However, if we return to the President's own bullfighter
analogy from the introduction, or the ship of state analogy, it is apparent where the mantle of
responsibility lies for any new U.S. missteps during 1961. Because of weaknesses in the
unity of the crisis management team, and inefficiency in the decision making process, the
Administration -- through its own doing — worked harder than it needed to on aspects of the
crisis for which it was not adequately prepared. Isolating themselves from the institutional
knowledge inherent in the government at the State Department, the CIA, and the Defense
Department, Kennedy and his team of intellectuals were nearly overcome by events. It took
President Kennedy from the time of his inauguration, until the third week in July to make a
decision which he had been advised to make (albeit not in a very forthright way) during the
first weeks of his presidency. Fault is not the issue. These are the facts.
If the State and Defense Departments, and the CIA would have been "brought on




more effective leaders for these Departments to begin with, the President would have been
better prepared to make the decisions he needed to make during the first six months of his
presidency. The U.S. would have been an initiator, not a reactionary. The risk of
miscalculation leading to war would have been lower. One can diffuse the responsibility for
errors by focusing on the nature of presidential transition, the pitfalls of politics, or the
ultimate lack of war, but the question remains: do we truly want to judge the leaders of our
country with, "well, at least he or she didn't do this... or that..."? Perhaps presidential
candidates should actually bring something with them to the White House, not make it up
after they get there?
We now look briefly at some successes and failures, some unanswered questions, and
some universal lessons learned.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Successes.
1) First and foremost, there was no miscalculation which led to war.
2) With that said, there was good analysis available from the very beginning, especially from
the Department of State, but Secretary Rusk, among others, did not assimilate and brief the
President well on this analysis.
3) HUMINT in the form of Oleg Pentkovskiy and Georgi Bolshakov was very useful. And
both the IC and Bobby Kennedy made solid analysis of this HUMINT.
4) Upon ultimate recognition of the gravity of the situation, Kennedy was able to get things
organized, assimilate the analysis, and make the decisions necessary regarding defense
buildup and negotiations, although it "wasn't pretty."
Failures.
1) The President should have received concise, cogent analysis from his transition team and
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staff immediately upon entering office. This should have been available from currently
existing sources within the government. The use of outside analysts did not significantly
enhance the decision making process, it only served to slow the process down.
2) The President should have known about Operation Chinese Wall, the plan to build a wall
through the center of Berlin, closing the border. The IC should have brought this to his
attention at the appropriate time and contingency plans should have been made. Ambassador
Thompson was ignored when he tried to highlight the refugee problem.
3) The President should have set up an efficient crisis decision making unit earlier.
4) The State Department should have activated the Special Operations Center earlier.
5) Finally, the intelligence analysis and decision making process at the White House was
plagued by all of the problems discussed in Chapter 5: communications problems (opaque
writing style, information overload), bureaucratic problems (poor professional relationships,
overuse of the worst case scenario, administrative incompetence), psychological impediments
(cognitive consistency, stress), as well as ideological and political obstacles (selection of
appointees for purely political reasons, screening out potentially "disloyal" elements from the
presidential analysis process, focus solely upon Khrushchev's Communist agenda instead of
local realities in Berlin).
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER THOUGHT
1) The Intelligence Community (IC) . Would better professional intelligence machinery have
helped? If Dulles had been replaced from the outset, would the CIA have played a stronger
role during the crisis? Would the status quo in Berlin have been different at the end of 1961
if the IC had been "healthier"?
2) The Local Situation in Berlin . If something had been done to control the refugee flow,
allay Soviet fears (intelligence exploitation, loss of "talent"), and give the East Germans
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hope, would Khrushchev have been compelled to build the Wall? Martin Hillenbrand asserts
that it would not have been politically acceptable in the U.S. or in any of our allied partners'
countries to have interfered with the refugee flow. 233 Western leaders also believed that it
was politically and psychologically helpful to reveal the abuses of the communist system.
Perhaps more effort could have been expended in looking for a creative way to stabilize the
situation?
3) The Wall . Considering the fact that it led to the decrease of tensions, was the Wall a bad
thing? Did the Wall allow politicians to defer the reunification of Germany longer than
necessary, further accentuating the economic contrast between East and West, for which we
(i.e, the U.S., NATO, Europe, Germany) are paying the price now? (economy,
unemployment, EMU, EU, etc.) According to Passavant and Nosser, "Before the Berlin
Wall opened on November 9, 1989, hardly anybody believed that the fierce divisions of
postwar Germany could be overcome in the foreseeable future. " 234
4) The Kennedy Administration . Is the speed and efficiency of the decision making process
important during crises such as this, or is slow and deliberate pursuit of policy always the
best approach? Is there such a thing as quick and deliberate? Also, if the Administration had
made the same decisions more quickly, would anything have turned out differently?
UNIVERSAL LESSONS LEARNED
Most of the analysis has been done as the paper has progressed. Richardson has
expressed what he believed was the didactic value in the crisis:
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although it was obscured at the time by acrimony over the format and content
of negotiations, the Western success in defusing successive deadlines by
recourse to exploratory discussions and personal diplomacy, and by placing
conditions on the holding of formal conferences, could be seen as a positive
'lesson' of the crisis and a potential precedent for future crisis diplomacy. 235
In my view, deeper analysis has revealed that the lessons to be learned are much more
detailed and practical. The following list reflects many of these universal lessons:
- Personal relationships on the crisis management decision making team count. Poor
professional interaction hampers information flow to the President.
- Management style counts. This is true not just at the White House but at State,
Defense and the CIA. If the President (or his trusted advisors for that matter) do not like the
job being performed by an appointee, that person should be given new guidance. If the
appointee is unable or unwilling to follow that new direction, he or she should be fired. The
Administration must not do its own work and that of weak departments. In the business
world, or in academia, businesses fold or enrollments decrease in quality in the worst case.
In the international community, wars begin. In the case of Berlin, the failure of intelligence
analysis and the presidential decision making process could have triggered World War III.
Making politically-based decisions (personnel or policy) vice insuring the flawless
performance of the decision making "team" is unexcusable. Performance should speak louder
than politics.
- The background of analysts counts. With a high concentration of academics and
business people (who had not recently worked in government at the policy level) supplying
the analysis from which the President would make life or death decisions, the existence of a




- Other crises in progress count. The continuity of analysis and decision making
must always be insured in the midst of distraction.
- Loyalty and candor are essential. This is so not just on the White House staff, but
in all those who interact with the staff. Closely related to this is the need for the succinctness
and candor of written analysis. State Department, CIA, or Defense analysis must be tailored
for the policy level audience.
- Finally, personal advocacy with the President is essential. If all of the above
elements occur but the President is "left out of the loop," how can he or she be expected to
make the best decisions in a timely manner? It is incumbent upon all who work at the policy
level to understand what true loyalty is. As Elbert Hubbard wrote in A Message to Garcia,
in March 1899: "It is not book learning young men need, nor instruction about this and that,
but a stiffening of the vertebrae which will cause them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly,
concentrate their energies, do a thing..." 236
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